Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor : : Why the United States Declared War on Germany / / Richard F. Hill.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Lynne Rienner Press Complete eBook-Package 2013-2000
• VerfasserIn: Hill, Richard F.,
• Place / Publishing House: Boulder : : Lynne Rienner Publishers, , [2022]; ©2003
• Year of Publication: 2022
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (227 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; 1 Introduction --; 2 Beaten to the Punch: Hitler’s Declaration of War --; 3 Actual Collaboration: German Guilt for Pearl Harbor --; 4 A Responsible Source: Where Were the German Military Forces? --; 5 War with the Axis: Europe Through the Backdoor --; 6 Puppetmaster --; 7 Hitler’s Fifth Column in Japan --; 8 Hitler Threatens Japanese Dupes --; 9 Nobody Knows: Better Safe Than Sorry --; 10 Conclusion: Why Did the United States Declare War on Germany? --; Appendix: Public Opinion Polls --; Selected Bibliography --; Index --; About the Book
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781626370005; 9783110784251
• DOI: 10.1515/9781626370005
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Richard F. Hill.

In the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. politicians, policymakers, and citizens focused their desire for retribution not on the obvious target, Japan, but on Hitler's Germany. Richard Hill challenges a major point of conventional wisdom on U.S.-Axis relations to explain why the U.S. held Hitler responsible for the Japanese action—and why Hitler's December 11 declaration of war was inconsequential to the U.S. involvement in the European theater. Hill's carefully argued analysis reveals widespread acceptance in late 1941 that the route to Tokyo was through Berlin—that Germany was the overlord of Japan, as well as its co-conspirator. Despite emerging uncertainty about German guilt for Pearl Harbor, he concludes, the prevailing public opinion in the first weeks after December 7 mandated a Germany-first strategy and continued to color U.S. policy throughout the war.