The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy / / Robert Jervis.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Jervis, Robert,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2019]; ©1985
• Year of Publication: 2019
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (204 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; Preface --; 1. The Nuclear Revolution --; 2. Tensions and Attempted Escapes --; 3. The Countervailing Strategy and Its Areas of Incoherence --; 4. Issues and Contradictions in the Countervailing Strategy --; 5. Escalation Dominance and Competition in Risk-Taking --; 6. Conclusions --; Notes --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501738654; 9783110536171
• DOI: 10.7591/9781501738654
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Robert Jervis.

Nuclear weapons have revolutionized the concept of military force, yet American military strategists continue to rely on theories derived from the prenuclear era to map out today's nuclear policy. In this path-breaking book, Robert Jervis asserts that their efforts have produced a policy full of inconsistency and contradiction. He calls for a new approach to strategy that will reflect the changes brought about by nuclear weapons.Jervis explores in depth the effects of nuclear weapons on world politics and the impossible problems they pose for traditional strategies. He provides a detailed critique of current American nuclear policy, focusing on counterforce, a notion that made sense in a world of conventional weapons, but is inappropriate in the wake of the nuclear revolution. He insists upon the almost inevitable escalation that would accompany any nuclear exchange and maintains that the existence of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that render any nuclear conflict between the superpowers suicidal—has made the concept of counterforce absurd.Jervis then turns to the broader issues of deterrence; in a cogent attack on the effectiveness of traditional military advantage in the nuclear era, he asserts that the U.S. can indeed deter strikes for which it may lack adequate defense. He outlines some first steps toward a more practical nuclear policy. Although no such policy can be fully rational, Jervis claims that we must begin to understand.the way in which force can influence an adversary's resolve, and to realize that the risk of escalation poses the greatest danger to us all.A landmark contribution to the ongoing debate over the threat of nuclear weapons, this book will be invaluable to anyone concerned about the direction of U.S. foreign policy.