The Wrong War : : American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 / / Rosemary Foot.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Foot, Rosemary,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2019]; ©1985
• Year of Publication: 2019
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (296 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; Abbreviations --; Chronology --; 1. Introduction --; 2. The International and Domestic Policy Settings --; 3. The U.S. Appraisal of Chinese and Soviet Policy: June 25-October 15, 1950 --; 4. China's Intervention and the U.S. Response: October 1950-February 1951 --; 5. Countercurrents, or the Relationship between Means and Ends: March 1951-February 1952 --; 6. Military Force as an Instrument of Policy: February—December 1952 --; 7. The Strategy for Ending the War: January-July 1953 --; 8. Conclusions --; Notes --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501734601; 9783110536171
• DOI: 10.7591/9781501734601
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Rosemary Foot.

In 1951, General Omar Bradley declared publicly that war with China would involve the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." Despite the stated intent of the U.S. to keep the Korean conflict from spreading, the debate on extending the war was far more intense and protracted than previous accounts of this period have suggested.Concentrating on the debate over expansion, Rosemary Foot reveals the strains it caused both within the U.S. bureaucracy and between America and its North Atlantic allies. She supplies important new information on the U.S. government's appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations between 1950 and 1953, and makes clear that a high proportion of U.S. officials came to recognize the limited nature of Soviet support for China. Explaining why the Eisenhower administration nearly unleashed nuclear weapons on China in the spring of 1953, Foot demonstrates that the Korean war would very likely have grown into a conflict of major proportions if the Chinese and North Koreans had not conceded the final issue of the truce talks—the question of the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war.