Balancing Risks : : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.
Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, e...
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Place / Publishing House: | Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2019] ©2004 |
Year of Publication: | 2019 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (336 p.) :; 8 tables, 1 line drawing |
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Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2019] ©2004 1 online resource (336 p.) : 8 tables, 1 line drawing text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022) International Studies. Political Science & Political History. Security Studies. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International). bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 9783110536157 print 9780801442216 https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501720253 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501720253 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501720253/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., |
spellingShingle |
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index |
author_facet |
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., |
author_variant |
j w t jw jwt j w t jw jwt |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., |
title |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / |
title_sub |
Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / |
title_full |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. |
title_fullStr |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. |
title_auth |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index |
title_new |
Balancing Risks : |
title_sort |
balancing risks : great power intervention in the periphery / |
series |
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs |
series2 |
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs |
publisher |
Cornell University Press, |
publishDate |
2019 |
physical |
1 online resource (336 p.) : 8 tables, 1 line drawing Issued also in print. |
contents |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index |
isbn |
9781501720253 9783110536157 9780801442216 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501720253 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501720253 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501720253/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
327 - International relations |
dewey-full |
327.1/09/04 |
dewey-sort |
3327.1 19 14 |
dewey-raw |
327.1/09/04 |
dewey-search |
327.1/09/04 |
doi_str_mv |
10.7591/9781501720253 |
oclc_num |
1121053917 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT taliaferrojeffreyw balancingrisksgreatpowerinterventionintheperiphery |
status_str |
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ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)534012 (OCoLC)1121053917 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Balancing Risks : Great Power Intervention in the Periphery / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |
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1806143910881263616 |
fullrecord |
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