The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy / / Terry Terriff.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Terriff, Terry,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2018]; ©1995
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (256 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; Abbreviations --; 1. The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence --; 2. The Changing Strategic Environment --; 3. Disquiet with Assured Destruction --; 4. The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel --; 5. Developing a Policy Consensus --; 6. The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy --; 7. Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance --; 8. Determinants of U.S. Nuclear Strategy --; Appendix: National Security Decision Memorandum 242 --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501717598; 9783110536171
• DOI: 10.7591/9781501717598
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Terry Terriff.

In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In this account of the Schlesinger Doctrine based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred.