Firm Interests : : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / / Cornelia Woll.

Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they ha...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
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Place / Publishing House:Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2018]
©2008
Year of Publication:2018
Language:English
Series:Cornell Studies in Political Economy
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Physical Description:1 online resource (208 p.) :; 7 line drawings
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id 9781501711497
ctrlnum (DE-B1597)515047
(OCoLC)1083604437
collection bib_alma
record_format marc
spelling Woll, Cornelia, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll.
Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018]
©2008
1 online resource (208 p.) : 7 line drawings
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
text file PDF rda
Cornell Studies in Political Economy
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2. Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4. Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5. International Air Transport -- 6. Who Captures Whom? -- 7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star
Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade.
Issued also in print.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
Corporations Political activity.
Free trade.
International trade.
Trade regulation.
Political Science & Political History.
Sociology & Social Science.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Economy. bisacsh
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 9783110536157
print 9780801446092
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501711497
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501711497
Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501711497/original
language English
format eBook
author Woll, Cornelia,
Woll, Cornelia,
spellingShingle Woll, Cornelia,
Woll, Cornelia,
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade /
Cornell Studies in Political Economy
Frontmatter --
Contents --
Figures and Tables --
Preface --
Acknowledgments --
1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? --
2. Business Interests in Political Economy --
3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform --
4. Basic Telecommunication Services --
5. International Air Transport --
6. Who Captures Whom? --
7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making --
Appendix: Interviews Conducted --
Bibliography --
Index
author_facet Woll, Cornelia,
Woll, Cornelia,
author_variant c w cw
c w cw
author_role VerfasserIn
VerfasserIn
author_sort Woll, Cornelia,
title Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade /
title_sub How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade /
title_full Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll.
title_fullStr Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll.
title_full_unstemmed Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll.
title_auth Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade /
title_alt Frontmatter --
Contents --
Figures and Tables --
Preface --
Acknowledgments --
1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? --
2. Business Interests in Political Economy --
3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform --
4. Basic Telecommunication Services --
5. International Air Transport --
6. Who Captures Whom? --
7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making --
Appendix: Interviews Conducted --
Bibliography --
Index
title_new Firm Interests :
title_sort firm interests : how governments shape business lobbying on global trade /
series Cornell Studies in Political Economy
series2 Cornell Studies in Political Economy
publisher Cornell University Press,
publishDate 2018
physical 1 online resource (208 p.) : 7 line drawings
Issued also in print.
contents Frontmatter --
Contents --
Figures and Tables --
Preface --
Acknowledgments --
1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? --
2. Business Interests in Political Economy --
3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform --
4. Basic Telecommunication Services --
5. International Air Transport --
6. Who Captures Whom? --
7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making --
Appendix: Interviews Conducted --
Bibliography --
Index
isbn 9781501711497
9783110536157
9780801446092
callnumber-first H - Social Science
callnumber-subject HF - Commerce
callnumber-label HF1713
callnumber-sort HF 41713 W653 42008EB
url https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501711497
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501711497
https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501711497/original
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 300 - Social sciences
dewey-tens 380 - Commerce, communications & transportation
dewey-ones 382 - International commerce
dewey-full 382/.3
dewey-sort 3382 13
dewey-raw 382/.3
dewey-search 382/.3
doi_str_mv 10.7591/9781501711497
oclc_num 1083604437
work_keys_str_mv AT wollcornelia firminterestshowgovernmentsshapebusinesslobbyingonglobaltrade
status_str n
ids_txt_mv (DE-B1597)515047
(OCoLC)1083604437
carrierType_str_mv cr
hierarchy_parent_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
is_hierarchy_title Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade /
container_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
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