Firm Interests : : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / / Cornelia Woll.
Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they ha...
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Place / Publishing House: | Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2018] ©2008 |
Year of Publication: | 2018 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Cornell Studies in Political Economy
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Woll, Cornelia, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018] ©2008 1 online resource (208 p.) : 7 line drawings text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Cornell Studies in Political Economy Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2. Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4. Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5. International Air Transport -- 6. Who Captures Whom? -- 7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022) Corporations Political activity. Free trade. International trade. Trade regulation. Political Science & Political History. Sociology & Social Science. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Economy. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 9783110536157 print 9780801446092 https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501711497 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501711497 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501711497/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Woll, Cornelia, Woll, Cornelia, |
spellingShingle |
Woll, Cornelia, Woll, Cornelia, Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornell Studies in Political Economy Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2. Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4. Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5. International Air Transport -- 6. Who Captures Whom? -- 7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index |
author_facet |
Woll, Cornelia, Woll, Cornelia, |
author_variant |
c w cw c w cw |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Woll, Cornelia, |
title |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / |
title_sub |
How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / |
title_full |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll. |
title_fullStr |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / Cornelia Woll. |
title_auth |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2. Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4. Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5. International Air Transport -- 6. Who Captures Whom? -- 7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index |
title_new |
Firm Interests : |
title_sort |
firm interests : how governments shape business lobbying on global trade / |
series |
Cornell Studies in Political Economy |
series2 |
Cornell Studies in Political Economy |
publisher |
Cornell University Press, |
publishDate |
2018 |
physical |
1 online resource (208 p.) : 7 line drawings Issued also in print. |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2. Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3. When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4. Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5. International Air Transport -- 6. Who Captures Whom? -- 7. Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index |
isbn |
9781501711497 9783110536157 9780801446092 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HF - Commerce |
callnumber-label |
HF1713 |
callnumber-sort |
HF 41713 W653 42008EB |
url |
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501711497 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501711497 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501711497/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
380 - Commerce, communications & transportation |
dewey-ones |
382 - International commerce |
dewey-full |
382/.3 |
dewey-sort |
3382 13 |
dewey-raw |
382/.3 |
dewey-search |
382/.3 |
doi_str_mv |
10.7591/9781501711497 |
oclc_num |
1083604437 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT wollcornelia firminterestshowgovernmentsshapebusinesslobbyingonglobaltrade |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)515047 (OCoLC)1083604437 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Firm Interests : How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |
_version_ |
1770177060979867648 |
fullrecord |
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