Minimal Verificationism : : On the Limits of Knowledge / / Gordian Haas.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2015 Part 1
• VerfasserIn: Haas, Gordian,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2015]; ©2015
• Year of Publication: 2015
• Language: English
• Series: Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind , 31
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (210 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Acknowledgements --; Contents --; Figures and Tables --; Introduction: Does This Make Nonsense to You? --; 1 Some Historic Formulations and Their Problems --; 2 More Problems Lie Ahead --; 3 Toward a Solution to the Problems --; 4 Minimal Verificationism --; 5 Fallibilist Theories of Justification --; 6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM --; 7 Combining Theories of Justification and Belief Revision: JuDAS --; 8 Lewis’ Semantics for Counterfactuals --; 9 Towards a Verifiability-Friendly Semantics for Counterfactuals --; 10 (Non) Concluding Remarks --; References --; Name Index --; Subject Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501501982; 9783110762518; 9783110700985; 9783110439687; 9783110438680
• ISSN: 2198-1884
• DOI: 10.1515/9781501501982
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Gordian Haas.

Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960s. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated historical concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea.