Chances for Peace : : Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict / / Elie Podeh.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Texas Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015
• VerfasserIn: Podeh, Elie,
• Place / Publishing House: Austin : : University of Texas Press, , [2021]; ©2015
• Year of Publication: 2021
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (407 p.)

Drawing on a newly developed theoretical definition of “missed opportunity,” Chances for Peace uses extensive sources in English, Hebrew, and Arabic to systematically measure the potentiality levels of opportunity across some ninety years of attempted negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With enlightening revelations that defy conventional wisdom, this study provides a balanced account of the most significant attempts to forge peace, initiated by the world’s superpowers, the Arabs (including the Palestinians), and Israel. From Arab-Zionist negotiations at the end of World War I to the subsequent partition, the aftermath of the 1967 War and the Sadat Initiative, and numerous agreements throughout the 1980s and 1990s, concluding with the Annapolis Conference in 2007 and the Abu Mazen-Olmert talks in 2008, pioneering scholar Elie Podeh uses empirical criteria and diverse secondary sources to assess the protagonists’ roles at more than two dozen key junctures. A resource that brings together historiography, political science, and the practice of peace negotiation, Podeh’s insightful exploration also showcases opportunities that were not missed. Three agreements in particular (Israeli-Egyptian, 1979; Israeli-Lebanese, 1983; and Israeli-Jordanian, 1994) illuminate important variables for forging new paths to successful negotiation. By applying his framework to a broad range of power brokers and time periods, Podeh also sheds light on numerous incidents that contradict official narratives. This unique approach is poised to reshape the realm of conflict resolution.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Maps -- Tables -- Preface -- Prologue: A Story of an Opportunity Not Missed -- Introduction -- Chapter One. The Faysal-Weizmann Agreement (1919) -- Chapter two. The Peel Plan for Partition (1937) -- Chapter three. The UN Partition Plan (1947) -- Chapter four. Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations (1946–1951) -- Chapter five. Israel and Syria: The Husni Zaʿim Initiative (1949) -- Chapter six. Israeli-Egyptian Relations: The Alpha Plan and the Anderson Mission (1949–1956) -- Chapter seven. Egyptian-Israeli Contacts (1965–1966) -- Chapter eight. Israel’s Peace Overtures in the Post-1967 Period -- Chapter nine. The Rogers Plan (1969) -- Chapter ten. The Jarring Mission and the Sadat Initiative (1971) -- Chapter eleven. Disengagement Agreements with Egypt and Syria (1973–1975) -- Chapter twelve. The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty: An Opportunity Not Missed (1979) -- Chapter thirteen. The Arab Peace Plan and the Reagan Plan (September 1982) -- Chapter fourteen. The Israeli-Lebanese Peace Agreement (May 1983) -- Chapter fifteen. The London Agreement (April 1987) -- Chapter sixteen. The Shultz Initiative (1988) and the Shamir Peace Plan (1989) -- Chapter seventeen. The Madrid Conference (1991) and the Oslo Agreements (1993–2000) -- Chapter eighteen. The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994) -- Chapter nineteen. Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (1991–2000) -- Chapter twenty. The Camp David Summit, the Clinton Parameters, and the Taba Talks (July 2000–January 2001) -- Chapter twenty-one. The Arab Peace Initiative (2002–2014) -- Chapter twenty-two. The US Road Map (April 2003) -- Chapter twenty-three. The Annapolis Conference and Abu Mazen–Olmert Talks (2007–2008) 340 -- Conclusions -- Postscript -- References -- Index