The Theory of Social Choice / / Peter C. Fishburn.

One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions fo...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1931-1979
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Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2015]
©1973
Year of Publication:2015
Language:English
Series:Princeton Legacy Library ; 1757
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Physical Description:1 online resource (278 p.)
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • CONTENTS
  • CHAPTER 1 Introduction
  • PART I. SOCIAL CHOICE WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES
  • CHAPTER 2. Social Choice Functions for Two Alternatives
  • CHAPTER 3. Duality and Representative Systems
  • CHAPTER 4. Decisive Coalitions and Representative Systems
  • CHAPTER 5. Weighted Voting and Anonymous Choice Functions
  • CHAPTER 6. Strong Decisiveness and Special Majorities
  • PART II. SIMPLE MAJORITY SOCIAL CHOICE
  • CHAPTER 7. Binary Relations and Binary Choices
  • CHAPTER 8. Simple Majority Social Choice
  • CHAPTER 9. Single-Peaked Preferences
  • CHAPTER 10. Guarantees and Triples
  • CHAPTER 11. Transitive Majorities
  • CHAPTER 12. Condorcet Conditions
  • CHAPTER 13. From Borda to Dodgson
  • PART III. SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
  • CHAPTER 14. Conditions for Social Choice
  • CHAPTER 15. Choice Functions and Passive Intraprofile Conditions
  • CHAPTER 16. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
  • CHAPTER 17. Summation Social Choice Functions
  • CHAPTER 18. Lotteries on Social Alternatives
  • REFERENCES
  • INDEX