Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 / / Richard D. Challener.

After the Spanish-American War the United States, both by design and by accident, became involved in the Caribbean and the Far East on a scale that would have seemed highly improbable before 1898. As an "emerging" world power, the United States had to grapple with new issues, among them th...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1931-1979
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Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2015]
©1973
Year of Publication:2015
Language:English
Series:Princeton Legacy Library ; 1355
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Physical Description:1 online resource (444 p.)
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Other title:Frontmatter --
Contents --
Acknowledgments --
Abbreviations For Sources Frequently Cited --
Introduction --
CHAPTER ONE: Ideas, Institutions, and Practices --
CHAPTER TWO: The Navy in the Caribbean in the Age of McKinIey and Roosevelt --
CHAPTER THREE: Asia and the American Military, 1898-1909 --
CHAPTER FOUR: Taft and Knox: The Military Dimensions of Dollar Diplomacy --
CHAPTER FIVE: Wilson and Bryan: Moralism and Military Power --
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions --
Bibliography --
Index
Summary:After the Spanish-American War the United States, both by design and by accident, became involved in the Caribbean and the Far East on a scale that would have seemed highly improbable before 1898. As an "emerging" world power, the United States had to grapple with new issues, among them the role of military men and military power in protecting and advancing America's position in the world.Richard D. Challener has examined civil-military relationships in the period 1898-1914 to answer the following questions: To what extent did army and navy officers develop opinions on foreign policy issues? Were the admirals and generals consulted by the civilian officials of government, and did they participate in decision-making? How did the President and State Department use the military services in execution of foreign policy? Were military and diplomatic policy co-ordinated? Does an examination of these relationships help to assess either the interpretations of Kennan and the "realists" or Williams and the "New Left"? And ultimately, how effectively did the United States manage to reconcile force and diplomacy?This book sustains the case for interpreting 1898 and its aftermath as a deliberate search for an "informal" or "insular" empire and shows that American leaders, both civil and military, accepted an interventionist ethic.Originally published in 1973.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Format:Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
ISBN:9781400867714
9783110426847
9783110413601
9783110442496
DOI:10.1515/9781400867714?locatt=mode:legacy
Access:restricted access
Hierarchical level:Monograph
Statement of Responsibility: Richard D. Challener.