Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / / Steve Weber.
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2014] ©1991 |
Year of Publication: | 2014 |
Edition: | Course Book |
Language: | English |
Series: | Princeton Legacy Library ;
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (344 p.) |
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Weber, Steve, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / Steve Weber. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2014] ©1991 1 online resource (344 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Princeton Legacy Library ; 166 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Current Approaches -- 3. Cooperation: A New Approach -- 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems -- 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles -- 6. Antisatellite Weapons -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control. An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--ChoiceOriginally published in 1991.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Game theory Soviet Union United States. Game theory. Nuclear arms control Soviet Union. Nuclear arms control United States. Strategic forces Soviet Union. Strategic forces United States. POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999 9783110413441 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package Law & Political Science 9783110413519 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 9783110442496 print 9780691604367 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862436?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400862436 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400862436.jpg |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Weber, Steve, Weber, Steve, |
spellingShingle |
Weber, Steve, Weber, Steve, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / Princeton Legacy Library ; Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Current Approaches -- 3. Cooperation: A New Approach -- 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems -- 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles -- 6. Antisatellite Weapons -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Index |
author_facet |
Weber, Steve, Weber, Steve, |
author_variant |
s w sw s w sw |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Weber, Steve, |
title |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / |
title_full |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / Steve Weber. |
title_fullStr |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / Steve Weber. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / Steve Weber. |
title_auth |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Current Approaches -- 3. Cooperation: A New Approach -- 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems -- 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles -- 6. Antisatellite Weapons -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Index |
title_new |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / |
title_sort |
cooperation and discord in u.s.-soviet arms control / |
series |
Princeton Legacy Library ; |
series2 |
Princeton Legacy Library ; |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2014 |
physical |
1 online resource (344 p.) Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Current Approaches -- 3. Cooperation: A New Approach -- 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems -- 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles -- 6. Antisatellite Weapons -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Index |
isbn |
9781400862436 9783110413441 9783110413519 9783110442496 9780691604367 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JX - International Law |
callnumber-label |
JX1974 |
callnumber-sort |
JX 41974.7 |
geographic_facet |
Soviet Union. United States. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862436?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400862436 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400862436.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
327 - International relations |
dewey-full |
327.1/74 |
dewey-sort |
3327.1 274 |
dewey-raw |
327.1/74 |
dewey-search |
327.1/74 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400862436?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
922698707 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT webersteve cooperationanddiscordinussovietarmscontrol |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)447569 (OCoLC)922698707 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package Law & Political Science Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999 |
_version_ |
1806143603842482176 |
fullrecord |
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