Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic / / Samuel Merrill.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999
• VerfasserIn: Merrill, Samuel,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2014]; ©1988
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Edition: Course Book
• Language: English
• Series: Princeton Legacy Library ; 912
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (172 p.)

This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation tha...

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter
• CONTENTS
• LIST OF FIGURES
• LIST OF TABLES
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner
• CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency
• CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency
• CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency
• CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk
• CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency
• CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules
• CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting
• CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems
• CHAPTER 10. Conclusions
• APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency
• APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function
• APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2
• APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules
• APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies
• APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX
• Backmatter