Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies / / Paul J. Quirk.
Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies....
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| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Legacy Lib. eBook Package 1980-1999 |
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| VerfasserIn: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2014] ©1981 |
| Year of Publication: | 2014 |
| Edition: | Course Book |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library ;
84 |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (274 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List Of Tables
- Preface
- Chapter I. Introduction: The Problem of Industry Influence
- Chapter II. Research Strategy: A Study of Policy Incentives
- Chapter III. Policy Attitudes As Incentives: The Effects of Regulatory Appointments
- Chapter IV. The Budgetary Incentive
- Chapter V. Industry Jobs and The Career Incentive
- Conclusions and Implications
- Appendix A. List of Officials Interviewed
- Appendix B The Interview Schedule
- Appendix C. Comment On Coding
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index