Knowing the Adversary : : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / / Keren Yarhi-Milo.
States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inference...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2014] ©2014 |
Year of Publication: | 2014 |
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Yarhi-Milo, Keren, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / Keren Yarhi-Milo. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2014] ©2014 1 online resource (360 p.) : 2 tables. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; 146 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention -- Chapter 2. Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 -- Chapter 3. British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 4. The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 5. The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80 -- Chapter 6. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 7. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 8. Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 -- Chapter 9. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 10. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 11. Summary and Implications -- Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses -- Notes -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments.Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework-called selective attention-that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Detente. Intelligence service. International relations. World politics 20th century. POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. bisacsh Adolf Hitler. Britain. Casper Weinberger. Cold War. Cyrus Vance. George Shultz. Jimmy Carter. Mikhail Gorbachev. National Intelligence Estimates. Nazi Germany. Ronald Reagan. Soviet Union. Special National Intelligence Estimates. U.S. foreign policy. U.S. intelligence organizations. U.S. national security. adversaries. behavior. capabilities. decision makers. diplomacy. dtente. foreign policy. intelligence organizations. intentions assessment. international politics. international relations theory. international relations. international security. military capabilities. military doctrine. military intentions. offense-defense theory. organizational expertise hypothesis. perceived intentions. political intentions. selective attention. state. strategic military doctrine. vividness hypothesis. Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 9783110665925 print 9780691159164 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400850419?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400850419 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400850419.jpg |
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English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Yarhi-Milo, Keren, |
spellingShingle |
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention -- Chapter 2. Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 -- Chapter 3. British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 4. The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 5. The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80 -- Chapter 6. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 7. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 8. Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 -- Chapter 9. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 10. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 11. Summary and Implications -- Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses -- Notes -- Index |
author_facet |
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Yarhi-Milo, Keren, |
author_variant |
k y m kym k y m kym |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, |
title |
Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / |
title_sub |
Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / |
title_full |
Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / Keren Yarhi-Milo. |
title_fullStr |
Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / Keren Yarhi-Milo. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / Keren Yarhi-Milo. |
title_auth |
Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention -- Chapter 2. Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 -- Chapter 3. British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 4. The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 5. The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80 -- Chapter 6. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 7. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 8. Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 -- Chapter 9. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 10. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 11. Summary and Implications -- Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses -- Notes -- Index |
title_new |
Knowing the Adversary : |
title_sort |
knowing the adversary : leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations / |
series |
Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; |
series2 |
Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2014 |
physical |
1 online resource (360 p.) : 2 tables. Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention -- Chapter 2. Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 -- Chapter 3. British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 4. The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions -- Chapter 5. The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80 -- Chapter 6. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 7. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente -- Chapter 8. Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 -- Chapter 9. US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 10. The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War -- Chapter 11. Summary and Implications -- Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses -- Notes -- Index |
isbn |
9781400850419 9783110665925 9780691159164 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JF - Public Administration |
callnumber-label |
JF1525 |
callnumber-sort |
JF 41525 I6 |
era_facet |
20th century. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400850419?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400850419 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400850419.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
327 - International relations |
dewey-full |
327.12 |
dewey-sort |
3327.12 |
dewey-raw |
327.12 |
dewey-search |
327.12 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400850419?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
984614483 |
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Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations / |
container_title |
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