Japan's Financial Crisis : : Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change / / Jennifer Amyx.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Backlist (2000-2014) eBook Package
• VerfasserIn: Amyx, Jennifer,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2013]; ©2004
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Edition: Course Book
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (392 p.) :; 10 line illus. 15 tables
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Figures --; Tables --; Abbreviations --; A Note on Conventions --; Acknowledgments --; Introduction --; Chapter One. Networks and State Performance --; Part I: Contours of Japan's Financial Policy Networks --; Chapter Two. Finance Ministry Ties with the Political Arena --; Chapter Three. Finance Ministry Ties with Private and Quasi-governmental Financial Institutions --; Chapter Four. Finance Ministry Ties with Other Government Agencies and the Central Bank --; Part II: Evolution of Network-based Regulation --; Chapter Five. Institutional "Fit" for Rapid Growth --; Chapter Six. Slowed Growth, Institutional Rigidity, and Reforms Postponed --; Chapter Seven. Network-managed Forbearance after the "Bubble" Bursts --; Chapter Eight. Policy Paralysis amid Deepening Crisis --; Part III: Institutional Change and System Transition --; Chapter Nine. A New Regulatory and Policymaking Paradigm --; Chapter Ten. Why Can't Japan Get Back on Track? --; Chapter Eleven. Conclusion --; Appendices --; Notes --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781400849635; 9783110649772; 9783110442502
• DOI: 10.1515/9781400849635
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Jennifer Amyx.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a massive speculative asset bubble burst in Japan, leaving the nation's banks with an enormous burden of nonperforming loans. Banking crises have become increasingly common across the globe, but what was distinctive about the Japanese case was the unusually long delay before the government intervened to aggressively address the bad debt problem. The postponed response by Japanese authorities to the nation's banking crisis has had enormous political and economic consequences for Japan as well as for the rest of the world. This book helps us understand the nature of the Japanese government's response while also providing important insights into why Japan seems unable to get its financial system back on track 13 years later. The book focuses on the role of policy networks in Japanese finance, showing with nuance and detail how Japan's Finance Ministry was embedded within the political and financial worlds, how that structure was similar to and different from that of its counterparts in other countries, and how the distinctive nature of Japan's institutional arrangements affected the capacity of the government to manage change. The book focuses in particular on two intervening variables that bring about a functional shift in the Finance Ministry's policy networks: domestic political change under coalition government and a dramatic rise in information requirements for effective regulation. As a result of change in these variables, networks that once enhanced policymaking capacity in Japanese finance became "paralyzing networks"--with disastrous results.