Political Bubbles : : Financial Crises and the Failure of American Democracy / / Nolan McCarty, Howard Rosenthal, Keith T. Poole.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: McCarty, Nolan,; Poole, Keith T.,; Rosenthal, Howard,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2013]; ©2013
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Edition: Course Book
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (368 p.) :; 3 halftones. 26 line illus. 11 tables.
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; Introduction --; Part I: The Political Bubble. Why Washington Allows Financial Crises to Occur --; Chapter 1. Bubble Expectations --; Chapter 2. Ideology --; Chapter 3. Interests --; Chapter 4. Institutions --; Chapter 5. The Political Bubble of the Crisis of 2008 --; Part II. Pops. Why Washington Delays in Solving Financial Crises --; Chapter 6. Historical Lessons of the Responses to Pops --; Chapter 7. The Pop of 2008 --; Chapter 8. "Pop"ulism --; Chapter 9 . How to Waste a Crisis --; Epilogue --; Notes --; Bibliography --; Name Index --; Subject Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781400846399; 9783110442502
• DOI: 10.1515/9781400846399?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Nolan McCarty, Howard Rosenthal, Keith T. Poole.

Behind every financial crisis lurks a "political bubble"--policy biases that foster market behaviors leading to financial instability. Rather than tilting against risky behavior, political bubbles--arising from a potent combination of beliefs, institutions, and interests--aid, abet, and amplify risk. Demonstrating how political bubbles helped create the real estate-generated financial bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, this book argues that similar government oversights in the aftermath of the crisis undermined Washington's response to the "popped" financial bubble, and shows how such patterns have occurred repeatedly throughout US history. The authors show that just as financial bubbles are an unfortunate mix of mistaken beliefs, market imperfections, and greed, political bubbles are the product of rigid ideologies, unresponsive and ineffective government institutions, and special interests. Financial market innovations--including adjustable-rate mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and credit default swaps--become subject to legislated leniency and regulatory failure, increasing hazardous practices. The authors shed important light on the politics that blinds regulators to the economic weaknesses that create the conditions for economic bubbles and recommend simple, focused rules that should help avoid such crises in the future. The first full accounting of how politics produces financial ruptures, Political Bubbles offers timely lessons that all sectors would do well to heed.