Reputation and International Cooperation : : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries / / Michael Tomz.
How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He expl...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2012] ©2008 |
Year of Publication: | 2012 |
Edition: | Course Book |
Language: | English |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (328 p.) :; 16 line illus. 27 tables. |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Preface
- PART ONE: THEORY
- Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt
- Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation
- PART TWO: EVIDENCE
- Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers
- Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion
- Chapter 5. Reputations during Good Times and Bad
- Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats
- Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions
- Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation
- PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS
- Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy
- Bibliography
- Index