Reputation and International Cooperation : : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries / / Michael Tomz.

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He expl...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
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Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2012]
©2008
Year of Publication:2012
Edition:Course Book
Language:English
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Physical Description:1 online resource (328 p.) :; 16 line illus. 27 tables.
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Tables
  • Figures
  • Preface
  • PART ONE: THEORY
  • Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt
  • Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation
  • PART TWO: EVIDENCE
  • Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers
  • Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion
  • Chapter 5. Reputations during Good Times and Bad
  • Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats
  • Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions
  • Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation
  • PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS
  • Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy
  • Bibliography
  • Index