Monitoring Democracy : : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / / Judith G. Kelley.
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessment...
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Kelley, Judith G., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / Judith G. Kelley. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2012] ©2012 1 online resource (336 p.) : 28 line illus. 38 tables. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Part I -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Th e Rise of a New Norm -- Chapter 3. The Shadow Market -- Chapter 4. What Influences Monitors' Assessments? -- Chapter 5. Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? -- Part II -- Chapter 6. International Monitors as Reinforcement -- Chapter 7. Are Monitored Elections Better? -- Chapter 8. Long- Term Effects -- Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly -- Appendix A: Data Description -- Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 -- Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 -- Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 -- Appendix E: Case Summaries -- Notes -- References -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction between domestic and international politics, Judith Kelley refutes prevailing arguments that international efforts cannot curb government behavior and that democratization is entirely a domestic process. Yet, she also shows that democracy promotion efforts are deficient and that outside actors often have no power and sometimes even do harm. Analyzing original data on over 600 monitoring missions and 1,300 elections, Kelley grounds her investigation in solid historical context as well as studies of long-term developments over several elections in fifteen countries. She pinpoints the weaknesses of international election monitoring and looks at how practitioners and policymakers might help to improve them. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Election monitoring Case studies. Election monitoring. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections. bisacsh Cold War. IGOs. NGOs. civil rights. democracy promotion. democracy. domestic governance. domestic political process. domestic politics. domestic potential. election cheating. election monitoring. election monitors. election patterns. election quality. elections. electoral cheating. electoral process. fairness. freedom. global governance. good electoral practices. governments. honesty. individual elections. international community. international election monitoring. international institutions. international leaders. international leverage. international monitors. international organizations. international politics. international standards. media organizations. monitoring efforts. monitoring information. monitoring organizations. monitoring process. monitoring. monitors. nonrandom intervention. organizational delegation. political conditionality. political rights. politicians. politics. qantitative data. recommendations. reinforcement. risky irregularities. safer irregularities. shadow market. skeptics. stability. transnational actors. Buntaine, Mark, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Kolev, Kiril, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442502 print 9780691152776 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842520?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400842520 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400842520.jpg |
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English |
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eBook |
author |
Kelley, Judith G., Kelley, Judith G., |
spellingShingle |
Kelley, Judith G., Kelley, Judith G., Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Part I -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Th e Rise of a New Norm -- Chapter 3. The Shadow Market -- Chapter 4. What Influences Monitors' Assessments? -- Chapter 5. Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? -- Part II -- Chapter 6. International Monitors as Reinforcement -- Chapter 7. Are Monitored Elections Better? -- Chapter 8. Long- Term Effects -- Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly -- Appendix A: Data Description -- Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 -- Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 -- Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 -- Appendix E: Case Summaries -- Notes -- References -- Index |
author_facet |
Kelley, Judith G., Kelley, Judith G., Buntaine, Mark, Buntaine, Mark, Kolev, Kiril, Kolev, Kiril, |
author_variant |
j g k jg jgk j g k jg jgk |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author2 |
Buntaine, Mark, Buntaine, Mark, Kolev, Kiril, Kolev, Kiril, |
author2_variant |
m b mb m b mb k k kk k k kk |
author2_role |
MitwirkendeR MitwirkendeR MitwirkendeR MitwirkendeR |
author_sort |
Kelley, Judith G., |
title |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / |
title_sub |
When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / |
title_full |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_fullStr |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_auth |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Part I -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Th e Rise of a New Norm -- Chapter 3. The Shadow Market -- Chapter 4. What Influences Monitors' Assessments? -- Chapter 5. Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? -- Part II -- Chapter 6. International Monitors as Reinforcement -- Chapter 7. Are Monitored Elections Better? -- Chapter 8. Long- Term Effects -- Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly -- Appendix A: Data Description -- Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 -- Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 -- Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 -- Appendix E: Case Summaries -- Notes -- References -- Index |
title_new |
Monitoring Democracy : |
title_sort |
monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2012 |
physical |
1 online resource (336 p.) : 28 line illus. 38 tables. Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Part I -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Th e Rise of a New Norm -- Chapter 3. The Shadow Market -- Chapter 4. What Influences Monitors' Assessments? -- Chapter 5. Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? -- Part II -- Chapter 6. International Monitors as Reinforcement -- Chapter 7. Are Monitored Elections Better? -- Chapter 8. Long- Term Effects -- Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly -- Appendix A: Data Description -- Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 -- Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 -- Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 -- Appendix E: Case Summaries -- Notes -- References -- Index |
isbn |
9781400842520 9783110442502 9780691152776 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JF - Public Administration |
callnumber-label |
JF1001 |
callnumber-sort |
JF 41001 K45 42017 |
genre_facet |
Case studies. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842520?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400842520 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400842520.jpg |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
324 - The political process |
dewey-full |
324.65 |
dewey-sort |
3324.65 |
dewey-raw |
324.65 |
dewey-search |
324.65 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400842520?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
979624180 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
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hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails / |
container_title |
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