Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / / Jaegwon Kim.
Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine,...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2007] ©2005 |
Year of Publication: | 2007 |
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Kim, Jaegwon, author. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / Jaegwon Kim. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2007] ©2005 1 online resource : 3 line illus. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Princeton Monographs in Philosophy ; 19 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Synopsis of the Arguments -- CHAPTER 1. Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems -- CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended -- CHAPTER 4. Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" -- CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work -- CHAPTER 6. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough -- References -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible? The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation. Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost. According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019) Mind and body. Philosophy of mind. PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter PUP eBook-Package 2000-2015 9783110662580 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Univ. Press eBook Package 2000-2013 9783110413434 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442502 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton eBook Package Backlist 2000-2014 9783110459531 print 9780691133850 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400840847 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400840847.jpg |
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Kim, Jaegwon, |
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Kim, Jaegwon, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / Princeton Monographs in Philosophy ; Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Synopsis of the Arguments -- CHAPTER 1. Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems -- CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended -- CHAPTER 4. Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" -- CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work -- CHAPTER 6. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough -- References -- Index |
author_facet |
Kim, Jaegwon, |
author_variant |
j k jk |
author_role |
VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Kim, Jaegwon, |
title |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / |
title_full |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / Jaegwon Kim. |
title_fullStr |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / Jaegwon Kim. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / Jaegwon Kim. |
title_auth |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Synopsis of the Arguments -- CHAPTER 1. Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems -- CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended -- CHAPTER 4. Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" -- CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work -- CHAPTER 6. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough -- References -- Index |
title_new |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / |
title_sort |
physicalism, or something near enough / |
series |
Princeton Monographs in Philosophy ; |
series2 |
Princeton Monographs in Philosophy ; |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2007 |
physical |
1 online resource : 3 line illus. Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Synopsis of the Arguments -- CHAPTER 1. Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems -- CHAPTER 2. The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended -- CHAPTER 4. Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" -- CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work -- CHAPTER 6. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough -- References -- Index |
isbn |
9781400840847 9783110662580 9783110413434 9783110442502 9783110459531 9780691133850 |
callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-subject |
BD - Speculative Philosophy |
callnumber-label |
BD418 |
callnumber-sort |
BD 3418.3 K55 42008EB |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400840847 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400840847.jpg |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-tens |
120 - Epistemology |
dewey-ones |
128 - Humankind |
dewey-full |
128.2 |
dewey-sort |
3128.2 |
dewey-raw |
128.2 |
dewey-search |
128.2 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400840847 |
oclc_num |
979954394 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kimjaegwon physicalismorsomethingnearenough |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)446574 (OCoLC)979954394 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter PUP eBook-Package 2000-2015 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton Univ. Press eBook Package 2000-2013 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton eBook Package Backlist 2000-2014 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter PUP eBook-Package 2000-2015 |
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1806143563071750144 |
fullrecord |
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