While Dangers Gather : : Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers / / William G. Howell, Jon Pevehouse.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Howell, William G.,; Pevehouse, Jon,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2011]; ©2007
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Edition: Course Book
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (384 p.) :; 1 halftone. 8 line illus. 30 tables.
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Figures --; Tables --; Preface --; Acknowledgments --; Part One. Background and Theory --; Chapter 1. Possibilities of Congressional Influence --; Chapter 2. Conditions that Abet Congressional Influence --; Part Two. Testing Claims about Congressional Influence --; Chapter 3. Trends in Military Deployments --; Chapter 4. Responding to "Opportunities" to Use Military Force (with Douglas L. Kriner) --; Chapter 5. Studies in Domestic Politics and the Use of Force --; Part Three. One Causal Pathway --; Chapter 6. Congress and the Media (with Douglas L. Kriner) --; Chapter 7. The Media and Public Opinion --; Chapter 8. Conclusion --; Appendix A. Tables Relating to Chapter 3 --; Appendix B. Text and Tables Relating to Chapter 4 --; Appendix C. Table Relating to Chapter 6 --; Appendix D. Table Relating to Chapter 7 --; Notes --; References --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781400840830; 9783110442502
• DOI: 10.1515/9781400840830
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: William G. Howell, Jon Pevehouse.

Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end.