Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance / / Laura L. Veldkamp.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Veldkamp, Laura L.,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2011]; ©2012
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (184 p.) :; 3 line illus.

Most theories in economics and finance predict what people will do, given what they know about the world around them. But what do people know about their environments? The study of information choice seeks to answer this question, explaining why economic players know what they know--and how the information they have affects collective outcomes. Instead of assuming what people do or don't know, information choice asks what people would choose to know. Then it predicts what, given that information, they would choose to do. In this textbook, Laura Veldkamp introduces graduate students in economics and finance to this important new research. The book illustrates how information choice is used to answer questions in monetary economics, portfolio choice theory, business cycle theory, international finance, asset pricing, and other areas. It shows how to build and test applied theory models with information frictions. And it covers recent work on topics such as rational inattention, information markets, and strategic games with heterogeneous information. Illustrates how information choice is used to answer questions in monetary economics, portfolio choice theory, business cycle theory, international finance, asset pricing, and other areas Teaches how to build and test applied theory models with information frictions Covers recent research on topics such as rational inattention, information markets, and strategic games with heterogeneous information

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- PART I. Preliminaries -- Chapter 1. Why Study Information Choice? -- Chapter 2. Bayesian Updating -- Chapter 3. Measuring Information Flows -- Chapter 4. Games with Heterogeneous Information -- PART II. Information Choice with Complementarity in Actions -- Chapter 5. Disclosing Public Information -- Chapter 6. Informational Inertia and Price-Setting -- PART III. Information Choice with Substitutability in Actions -- Chapter 7. Information Choice and Investment Choice -- Chapter 8. Returns to Scale in Information -- Chapter 9. Information as an Aggregate Shock -- PART IV. Measurement -- Chapter 10. Testing Information Theories -- Chapter 11. Conclusions -- References -- Index