Philosophical Essays. / Volume 2, : Philosophical Essays, Volume 2 ; The Philosophical Significance of Language / / Scott Soames.
The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter PUP eBook-Package 2000-2015 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2009] ©2009 |
Year of Publication: | 2009 |
Edition: | Course Book |
Language: | English |
Series: | Philosophical Essays ;
Volume 2 |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The Origins of These Essays
- Introduction
- PART ONE. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes
- ESSAY ONE. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content
- ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances
- ESSAY THREE. Belief and Mental Representation
- ESSAY FOUR. Attitudes and Anaphora
- PART TWO. Modality
- ESSAY FIVE. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions
- ESSAY SIX. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori
- ESSAY SEVEN. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds
- ESSAY EIGHT. Understanding Assertion
- ESSAY NINE. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism
- ESSAY TEN. Actually
- PART THREE. Truth and Vagueness
- ESSAY ELEVEN. What Is a Theory of Truth?
- ESSAY TWELVE. Understanding Deflationism
- ESSAY THIRTEEN. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates
- ESSAY FOURTEEN. The Possibility of Partial Definition
- PART FOUR. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule
- ESSAY FIFTEEN. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox
- ESSAY SIXTEEN. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox
- Index