Borrowing Constitutional Designs : : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic / / Cindy Skach.

After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, i...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
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Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2011]
©2005
Year of Publication:2011
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Language:English
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Physical Description:1 online resource (168 p.) :; 15 line illus. 4 tables.
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Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic / Cindy Skach.
Course Book
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2011]
©2005
1 online resource (168 p.) : 15 line illus. 4 tables.
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
text file PDF rda
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Preface -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1. Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law -- CHAPTER 2. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic -- CHAPTER 3. Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany -- CHAPTER 4. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic -- CHAPTER 5. Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic -- CONCLUSION -- Bibliography -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star
After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature. Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs.
Issued also in print.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Constitutions. bisacsh
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442502
print 9780691123455
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400832620
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400832620
Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400832620.jpg
language English
format eBook
author Skach, Cindy,
Skach, Cindy,
spellingShingle Skach, Cindy,
Skach, Cindy,
Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /
Frontmatter --
Contents --
Tables and Figures --
Preface --
INTRODUCTION --
CHAPTER 1. Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law --
CHAPTER 2. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic --
CHAPTER 3. Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany --
CHAPTER 4. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic --
CHAPTER 5. Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic --
CONCLUSION --
Bibliography --
Index
author_facet Skach, Cindy,
Skach, Cindy,
author_variant c s cs
c s cs
author_role VerfasserIn
VerfasserIn
author_sort Skach, Cindy,
title Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /
title_sub Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /
title_full Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic / Cindy Skach.
title_fullStr Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic / Cindy Skach.
title_full_unstemmed Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic / Cindy Skach.
title_auth Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /
title_alt Frontmatter --
Contents --
Tables and Figures --
Preface --
INTRODUCTION --
CHAPTER 1. Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law --
CHAPTER 2. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic --
CHAPTER 3. Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany --
CHAPTER 4. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic --
CHAPTER 5. Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic --
CONCLUSION --
Bibliography --
Index
title_new Borrowing Constitutional Designs :
title_sort borrowing constitutional designs : constitutional law in weimar germany and the french fifth republic /
publisher Princeton University Press,
publishDate 2011
physical 1 online resource (168 p.) : 15 line illus. 4 tables.
Issued also in print.
edition Course Book
contents Frontmatter --
Contents --
Tables and Figures --
Preface --
INTRODUCTION --
CHAPTER 1. Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law --
CHAPTER 2. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic --
CHAPTER 3. Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany --
CHAPTER 4. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic --
CHAPTER 5. Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic --
CONCLUSION --
Bibliography --
Index
isbn 9781400832620
9783110442502
9780691123455
callnumber-first J - Political Science
callnumber-subject JF - Public Administration
callnumber-label JF251
callnumber-sort JF 3251
url https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400832620
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400832620
https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400832620.jpg
illustrated Illustrated
doi_str_mv 10.1515/9781400832620
oclc_num 979577112
work_keys_str_mv AT skachcindy borrowingconstitutionaldesignsconstitutionallawinweimargermanyandthefrenchfifthrepublic
status_str n
ids_txt_mv (DE-B1597)446747
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hierarchy_parent_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
is_hierarchy_title Borrowing Constitutional Designs : Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /
container_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
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