Power by Design : : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / / Suisheng Zhao.
First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again i...
Saved in:
Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package |
---|---|
VerfasserIn: | |
Place / Publishing House: | Honolulu : : University of Hawaii Press, , [1995] ©1995 |
Year of Publication: | 1995 |
Language: | English |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (232 p.) |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
id |
9780824863982 |
---|---|
ctrlnum |
(DE-B1597)483864 (OCoLC)1024051607 |
collection |
bib_alma |
record_format |
marc |
spelling |
Zhao, Suisheng, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao. Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, [1995] ©1995 1 online resource (232 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Note on Romanization -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- CHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- CHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- CHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 -- CHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 -- CHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 -- CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. although scholars of comparative politics have shown great interest in the institutional choice between parliamentarianism and presidentialism in democratic countries, they have paid little attention to the study of constitutional frameworks in authoritarian settings. By offering a clear and original re-interpretation of the history of this power struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and his rivals over institutional design, Zhao challenges the conventional wisdom that has underestimated the importance of formal institutions in non-democratic regimes.Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are diven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.Notable for its persuasive integration of political science theory and the historical evidence, Power by Design is an insightful re-interpretation of Chinese history that will be welcomed by scholars of modern China and those interested in the consequences of the nationalist politics that continue to reverberate in contemporary Chine, as well as by comparative political scientists studying constitution-making and institutional design. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022) Constitutional history Taiwan. POLITICAL SCIENCE / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package 9783110649680 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Hawaii Press Archive eBook-Package Pre-2000 9783110564150 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824863982 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780824863982 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780824863982/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Zhao, Suisheng, Zhao, Suisheng, |
spellingShingle |
Zhao, Suisheng, Zhao, Suisheng, Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Note on Romanization -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- CHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- CHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- CHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 -- CHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 -- CHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 -- CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index |
author_facet |
Zhao, Suisheng, Zhao, Suisheng, |
author_variant |
s z sz s z sz |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Zhao, Suisheng, |
title |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / |
title_sub |
Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / |
title_full |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao. |
title_fullStr |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao. |
title_auth |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Note on Romanization -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- CHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- CHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- CHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 -- CHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 -- CHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 -- CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index |
title_new |
Power by Design : |
title_sort |
power by design : constitution-making in nationalist china / |
publisher |
University of Hawaii Press, |
publishDate |
1995 |
physical |
1 online resource (232 p.) |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Note on Romanization -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- CHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- CHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- CHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- CHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 -- CHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 -- CHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 -- CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index |
isbn |
9780824863982 9783110649680 9783110564150 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JQ - Europe |
callnumber-label |
JQ1522 |
callnumber-sort |
JQ 41522 Z43 41996 |
geographic_facet |
Taiwan. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824863982 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780824863982 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780824863982/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
320 - Political science |
dewey-full |
320.951/09/041 |
dewey-sort |
3320.951 19 241 |
dewey-raw |
320.951/09/041 |
dewey-search |
320.951/09/041 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9780824863982 |
oclc_num |
1024051607 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT zhaosuisheng powerbydesignconstitutionmakinginnationalistchina |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)483864 (OCoLC)1024051607 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Hawaii Press Archive eBook-Package Pre-2000 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Power by Design : Constitution-Making in Nationalist China / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package |
_version_ |
1770176589642858496 |
fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05861nam a22006975i 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">9780824863982</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-B1597</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220302035458.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m|||||o||d||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr || ||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220302t19951995hiu fo d z eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780824863982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1515/9780824863982</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-B1597)483864</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1024051607</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-B1597</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-B1597</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">hiu</subfield><subfield code="c">US-HI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">JQ1522</subfield><subfield code="b">.Z43 1996</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POL000000</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">320.951/09/041</subfield><subfield code="2">20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhao, Suisheng, </subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield><subfield code="4">http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Power by Design :</subfield><subfield code="b">Constitution-Making in Nationalist China /</subfield><subfield code="c">Suisheng Zhao.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Honolulu : </subfield><subfield code="b">University of Hawaii Press, </subfield><subfield code="c">[1995]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©1995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (232 p.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="347" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text file</subfield><subfield code="b">PDF</subfield><subfield code="2">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="t">Frontmatter -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Contents -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Note on Romanization -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Abbreviations -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Acknowledgments -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 -- </subfield><subfield code="t">CHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Notes -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Selected Bibliography -- </subfield><subfield code="t">Index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="506" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">restricted access</subfield><subfield code="u">http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec</subfield><subfield code="f">online access with authorization</subfield><subfield code="2">star</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. although scholars of comparative politics have shown great interest in the institutional choice between parliamentarianism and presidentialism in democratic countries, they have paid little attention to the study of constitutional frameworks in authoritarian settings. By offering a clear and original re-interpretation of the history of this power struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and his rivals over institutional design, Zhao challenges the conventional wisdom that has underestimated the importance of formal institutions in non-democratic regimes.Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are diven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.Notable for its persuasive integration of political science theory and the historical evidence, Power by Design is an insightful re-interpretation of Chinese history that will be welcomed by scholars of modern China and those interested in the consequences of the nationalist politics that continue to reverberate in contemporary Chine, as well as by comparative political scientists studying constitution-making and institutional design.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="538" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In English.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Constitutional history</subfield><subfield code="z">Taiwan.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE / General.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Title is part of eBook package:</subfield><subfield code="d">De Gruyter</subfield><subfield code="t">Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package</subfield><subfield code="z">9783110649680</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Title is part of eBook package:</subfield><subfield code="d">De Gruyter</subfield><subfield code="t">University of Hawaii Press Archive eBook-Package Pre-2000</subfield><subfield code="z">9783110564150</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824863982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780824863982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="3">Cover</subfield><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780824863982/original</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">978-3-11-056415-0 University of Hawaii Press Archive eBook-Package Pre-2000</subfield><subfield code="b">2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">978-3-11-064968-0 Asian Studies Archive (pre 2000) eBook Package</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_BACKALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_CL_SN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_EBACKALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_EBKALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_ECL_SN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_EEBKALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_ESSHALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_PPALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_SSHALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBA_STMALL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV-deGruyter-alles</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PDA11SSHE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PDA12STME</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PDA13ENGE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PDA17SSHEE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PDA5EBK</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |