Sometimes Always True : : Undogmatic Pluralism in Politics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology / / Jeremy Barris.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Fordham University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015
• VerfasserIn: Barris, Jeremy,
• Place / Publishing House: New York, NY : : Fordham University Press, , [2015]; ©2015
• Year of Publication: 2015
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (320 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; Acknowledgments --; Introduction: Sometimes Always True --; 1. Comparing Different Cultural or Theoretical Frameworks: Davidson, Rorty, and the Nature of Truth --; 2. An Internal Connection between Logic and Rhetoric, between Frameworks, and a Legitimate Foundation for Knowledge --; 3. Pluralism, Legitimate Self- Contradiction, and a Proposed Solution to Some Shared Fundamental Problems of Political and Mainstream Epistemology --; 4. The Logic of Genuine Political Pluralism and Oscar Wilde's Artificiality of Wit and Style --; 5. Foucault's Pluralism and the Possibility of Truth and of Ideology Critique --; 6. How to Be Properly Unnatural: The Metaphysics of Heterosexual Normativity and the Importance of the Concepts of Essence and Nature for Pluralism --; 7. The Necessary Inconclusiveness of Heideggerian Interpretation of Metaphysics and the Undecided Nature of Essential or Logical Connection --; 8. The Formal Structure of Metaphysics and The Importance of Being Earnest --; 9. The Logical Structure of Dreams and Their Relation to Reality --; Coda: Overviews --; References --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780823262168; 9783110729030
• DOI: 10.1515/9780823262168
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Jeremy Barris.

Sometimes Always True aims to resolve three connected problems. First, we need an undogmatic pluralist standpoint in political theory, metaphysics, and epistemology. But genuine pluralism suffers from the contradiction that making room for fundamental differences in outlook means making room for outlooks that exclude pluralism.Second, philosophy involves reflecting on the world and meaning as a whole, yet this means adopting a vantage point in some way outside of meaning.Third, our lived experience of the sense of our lives similarly undermines its own sense, as it involves having a vantage point in some way wholly outside ourselves.In detailed engagement with, among others, Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, Foucault, Wilde, and gender and sexuality theory, the book argues that these contradictions are so thoroughgoing that, like the liar's paradox, they cancel the bases of their own meaning. Consequently, it argues, they resolve themselves and do so in a way that produces a vantage point on these issues that is not dogmatically circular because it is, workably, both within and outside these issues' sense. The solution to a genuinely undogmatic pluralism, then, is to enter into these contradictions and the process of their self-resolution.