Two Presidents Are Better Than One : : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / / David Orentlicher.
“Many Americans are unsatisfied with politics. Simultaneously, we are hesitant to question the basic soundness of our constitutional system. In this refreshingly provocative book, David Orentlicher explains why it is due time for us to reconsider dominant ideas about the presidency, now arguably our...
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Place / Publishing House: | New York, NY : : New York University Press, , [2013] ©2013 |
Year of Publication: | 2013 |
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Orentlicher, David, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / David Orentlicher. New York, NY : New York University Press, [2013] ©2013 1 online resource text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A two-person, bipartisan executive -- 3. The problem of the imperial presidency -- 4. The problem of partisan conflict -- 5. A bipartisan executive and presidential decision making -- 6. Representation for the public in Washington -- 7. The prospects for adopting a two-person presidency -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star “Many Americans are unsatisfied with politics. Simultaneously, we are hesitant to question the basic soundness of our constitutional system. In this refreshingly provocative book, David Orentlicher explains why it is due time for us to reconsider dominant ideas about the presidency, now arguably our most powerful political institution. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the best executive is necessarily a unitary executive, Orentlicher makes a wonderful case for why ‘two presidents are better than one.’ Sure to be of interest to political scientists, legal scholars, as well as informed citizens justifiably worried about the fate of American democracy, this fascinating book dares to challenge everything you thought you knew about one of our favorite political institutions.”-William E. Scheuerman, Indiana University “Can Orentlicher be serious in calling for a plural executive? The answer is yes, and he presents thoughtful and challenging arguments responding to likely criticisms. Any readers who are other than completely complacent about the current state of American politics will have to admire Orentlicher’s distinctive audacity and to respond themselves to his well-argued points.”-Sanford Levinson, author of Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance When talking heads and political pundits make their “What’s Wrong with America” lists, two concerns invariably rise to the top: the growing presidential abuse of power and the toxic political atmosphere in Washington. In Two Presidents Are Better Than One, David Orentlicher shows how the “imperial presidency” and partisan conflict are largely the result of a deeper problem-the Constitution’s placement of a single president atop the executive branch. Accordingly, writes Orentlicher, we can fix our broken political system by replacing the one person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party executive branch. Orentlicher contends that our founding fathers did not anticipate the extent to which their checks and balances would fail to contain executive power and partisan discord. They also did not foresee how the imperial presidency would aggravate partisan conflict. As the stakes in presidential elections have grown ever higher since the New Deal, battles to capture the White House have greatly exacerbated partisan differences. Had the framers been able to predict the future, Orentlicher argues, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a single leader at the head of the executive branch and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties. Analyzing the histories of other countries with a plural executive branch and past examples of bipartisan cooperation within Congress, Orentlicher shows us why and how to implement a two-person, two-party presidency. Ultimately, Two Presidents Are Better Than One demonstrates why we need constitutional reform to rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches and contain partisan conflict in Washington. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 06. Mrz 2024) Executive departments United States. Political leadership United States. Presidents United States. Presidents United States, POLITICAL SCIENCE / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter New York University Press Backlist eBook-Package 2000-2013 9783110706444 print 9780814789490 https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814724682.001.0001 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780814724682 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780814724682/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Orentlicher, David, Orentlicher, David, |
spellingShingle |
Orentlicher, David, Orentlicher, David, Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A two-person, bipartisan executive -- 3. The problem of the imperial presidency -- 4. The problem of partisan conflict -- 5. A bipartisan executive and presidential decision making -- 6. Representation for the public in Washington -- 7. The prospects for adopting a two-person presidency -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author |
author_facet |
Orentlicher, David, Orentlicher, David, |
author_variant |
d o do d o do |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Orentlicher, David, |
title |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / |
title_sub |
The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / |
title_full |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / David Orentlicher. |
title_fullStr |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / David Orentlicher. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / David Orentlicher. |
title_auth |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A two-person, bipartisan executive -- 3. The problem of the imperial presidency -- 4. The problem of partisan conflict -- 5. A bipartisan executive and presidential decision making -- 6. Representation for the public in Washington -- 7. The prospects for adopting a two-person presidency -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author |
title_new |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : |
title_sort |
two presidents are better than one : the case for a bipartisan executive branch / |
publisher |
New York University Press, |
publishDate |
2013 |
physical |
1 online resource |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A two-person, bipartisan executive -- 3. The problem of the imperial presidency -- 4. The problem of partisan conflict -- 5. A bipartisan executive and presidential decision making -- 6. Representation for the public in Washington -- 7. The prospects for adopting a two-person presidency -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author |
isbn |
9780814724682 9783110706444 9780814789490 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JK - United States |
callnumber-label |
JK516 |
callnumber-sort |
JK 3516 O75 42013 |
geographic_facet |
United States. United States, |
url |
https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814724682.001.0001 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780814724682 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780814724682/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
350 - Public administration & military science |
dewey-ones |
352 - General considerations of public administration |
dewey-full |
352.230973 |
dewey-sort |
3352.230973 |
dewey-raw |
352.230973 |
dewey-search |
352.230973 |
doi_str_mv |
10.18574/nyu/9780814724682.001.0001 |
oclc_num |
827948839 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT orentlicherdavid twopresidentsarebetterthanonethecaseforabipartisanexecutivebranch |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)547086 (OCoLC)827948839 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter New York University Press Backlist eBook-Package 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Two Presidents Are Better Than One : The Case for a Bipartisan Executive Branch / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter New York University Press Backlist eBook-Package 2000-2013 |
_version_ |
1806143411095339008 |
fullrecord |
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