Prosecutors in the Boardroom : : Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct / / ed. by Rachel E. Barkow, Anthony S. Barkow.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter New York University Press Backlist eBook-Package 2000-2013
• MitwirkendeR: Alexander, Cindy R.,; Arlen, Jennifer,; Barkow, Anthony S.,; Barkow, Rachel E.,; Buell, Samuel W.,; Cohen, Mark A.,; Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino,; Epstein, Richard A.,; Garrett, Brandon L.,; Kern Griffin, Lisa,; Khanna, Vikramaditya,; Sun Beale, Sara,
• HerausgeberIn: Barkow, Anthony S.,; Barkow, Rachel E.,
• Place / Publishing House: New York, NY : : New York University Press, , [2011]; ©2011
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource

Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companie...

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective
• 2. Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions
• 3. Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms
• 4. Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability
• 5. Inside-Out Enforcement
• 6. The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime
• 7. Collaborative Organizational Prosecution
• 8. The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency
• 9. What Are the Rules If Everybody Wants to Play? Multiple Federal and State Prosecutors (Acting) as Regulators
• 10. Reforming the Corporate Monitor?
• Conclusion
• Contributors
• Index