What Caused the Financial Crisis /

What Caused the Financial Crisis / / ed. by Jeffrey Friedman.

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The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essential...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Penn Press eBook Package Complete Collection
MitwirkendeR:
Acemoglu, Daron,
Acharya, Viral V.,
Bhidé, Amar,
Colander, David,
Friedman, Jeffrey,
Gjerstad, Steven,
Goldberg, Michael,
Haas, Armin,
Jabłecki, Juliusz,
Juselius, Katarina,
Kirman, Alan,
Lux, Thomas,
Machaj, Mateusz,
Posner, Richard A.,
Richardson, Matthew,
Sloth, Brigitte,
Smith, Vernon L.,
Stiglitz, Joseph E.,
Taylor, John B.,
Wallison, Peter J.,
White, Lawrence J.,
HerausgeberIn:
Friedman, Jeffrey,
TeilnehmendeR:
Posner, Richard A.
Place / Publishing House:Philadelphia : : University of Pennsylvania Press, , [2011]
©2011
Year of Publication:2011
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (376 p.) :; 36 illus.
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Illustrations
  • Chapter 1. Capitalism and the Crisis: Bankers, Bonuses, Ideology, and Ignorance
  • PART I. The Crisis in Historical Perspective
  • Chapter 2. An Accident Waiting to Happen: Securities Regulation and Financial Deregulation
  • Chapter 3. Monetary Policy, Credit Extension, and Housing Bubbles, 2008 and 1929
  • PART II. What Went Wrong (and What Didn't)?
  • Chapter 4. The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed America's Economy?
  • Chapter 5. Monetary Policy, Economic Policy and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong
  • Chapter 6. Housing Initiatives and Other Policy Factors
  • Chapter 7. How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial Sector
  • Chapter 8. A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks' Leverage
  • Chapter 9. The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle
  • Chapter 10. Credit-Default Swaps and the Crisis
  • PART III. Economists, Economics, and the Financial Crisis
  • Chapter 11. The Crisis of 2008: Lessons for and from Economics
  • Chapter 12. The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession
  • Afterword. The Causes of the Financial Crisis
  • Abbreviations and Acronyms
  • Notes
  • References
  • Contributors
  • Index
  • Acknowledgments

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