Inadvertent Escalation : : Conventional War and Nuclear Risks / / Barry R. Posen.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Posen, Barry R.,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2014]; ©2014
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (296 p.) :; 22 tables, 12 figures

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Preface -- 1. Introduction: A Model of Inadvertent Escalation -- 2. Air War and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation -- 3. The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front -- 4. Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank -- 5. "Offensive" and "Defensive" Sea Control: A Comparative Assessment -- 6. Conclusion -- APPENDIX 1. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Model -- APPENDIX 2. Central Region Close Air Support Aircraft and Attack Helicopters (1988) -- APPENDIX 3. The Attrition-FEBA Expansion Model: Symphony Version -- APPENDIX 4. A Barrier Defense Model -- Selected Bibliography -- Index