The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War / / Donald Kagan.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Kagan, Donald,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2013]; ©2013
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (420 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Preface --; Contents --; Abbreviations and Short Titles --; Introduction --; Part One The Alliance System and the Division of the Greek World --; 1. The Spartan Alliance --; 2. The Origins of the Athenian Empire --; 3. Sparta after the Persian War --; 4. Athens after the Persian War --; Part Two The First Peloponnesian War --; 5. The War in Greece --; 6. The Crisis In the Aegean --; 7. The End of the War --; Part Three The Years of Peace --; 8. Athenian Politics: The Victory of Pericles --; 9. Athens and the West: The Foundation of Thurii --; 10. The Samian Rebellion --; 11. The Consolidation of the Empire --; 12. Athenian Politics on the Eve of the War --; Part Four The Final Crisis --; 13. Epidamnus --; 14. Corcyra --; 15. Megara --; 16. Potidaea --; 17. Sparta --; 18. Athens --; Part Five Conclusions --; 19. The Causes of the War --; 20. Thucydides and the Inevitability of the War --; Appendixes --; Bibliography --; General Index --; Index of Ancient Authors and Inscriptions --; Index of Modern Authors
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780801467219; 9783110536157
• DOI: 10.7591/9780801467219
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Donald Kagan.

The first volume of Donald Kagan's acclaimed four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War offers a new evaluation of the origins and causes of the conflict, based on evidence produced by modern scholarship and on a careful reconsideration of the ancient texts. He focuses his study on the question: Was the war inevitable, or could it have been avoided?Kagan takes issue with Thucydides' view that the war was inevitable, that the rise of the Athenian Empire in a world with an existing rival power made a clash between the two a certainty. Asserting instead that the origin of the war "cannot, without serious distortion, be treated in isolation from the internal history of the states involved," Kagan traces the connections between domestic politics, constitutional organization, and foreign affairs. He further examines the evidence to see what decisions were made that led to war, at each point asking whether a different decision would have been possible.