Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers : : Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / / David E. Johnson.

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
VerfasserIn:
Place / Publishing House:Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2013]
©2013
Year of Publication:2013
Language:English
Series:Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (304 p.) :; 3 tables
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Part I. Soldiers and Machines: 1917-1920
  • 1. America, the Army, and the Great War
  • 2. The Tank Corps
  • 3. The Air Service
  • 4. The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War
  • Part II. Inertia and Insurgency: 1921-1930
  • 5. Peace and Quiet
  • 6. Infantry Tanks
  • 7. The Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force
  • 8. The War Department
  • Part III. Alternatives and Autonomy: 1931-1942
  • 9. From Domestic Depression to International Crusade
  • 10. Alternatives for Armor
  • 11. Autonomous Air Power
  • 12. A Crisis in the War Department
  • Part IV. Dying for Change: 1942-1945
  • 13. The Arsenal of Attrition
  • 14. Armored Bludgeon
  • 15. Air Force Triumphant
  • 16. Coequal Land Power and Air Power
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Primary Sources
  • Index