Prosper or Perish : : Credit and Fiscal Systems in Rural China / / Lynette H. Ong.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Asian Studies Backlist (2000-2014) eBook Package
• VerfasserIn: Ong, Lynette H.,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2012]; ©2012
• Year of Publication: 2012
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (232 p.) :; 35 tables, 8 line figures, 3 maps

The official banking institutions for rural China are Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs). Although these co-ops are mandated to support agricultural development among farm households, since 1980 half of RCC loans have gone to small and medium-sized industrial enterprises located in, and managed by, townships and villages. These township and village enterprises have experienced highly uneven levels of success, and by the end of the 1990s, half of all RCC loans were in or close to default, forcing China's central bank to bail out RCCs. In Prosper or Perish, Lynette H. Ong examines the bias in RCC lending patterns, focusing on why the mobilization of rural savings has contributed to successful industrial development in some locales but not in others.Interweaving insightful and theoretically informed discussions of rural credit, development, governance, and bank bailouts, Ong identifies various sources for China's uneven development. In the highly decentralized fiscal environment of the People's Republic, successful industrialization has significant implications for rural governance. Local governments depend on revenue from industrial output to provide public goods and services; unsuccessful enterprises starve local governments of revenue and result in radical cutbacks in services. High peasant burdens, land takings without adequate compensation by local governments, and other poor governance practices tend to be associated with unsuccessful industrialization. In light of the recent liberalization of the rural credit sector in China, Prosper or Perish makes a significant contribution to debates within political science, economic development, and international banking.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- Part I. Overview and Research Questions -- 1. Local Governments, Rural Credit, and Regional Development in China -- Appendix: Case Study Indicators, Household Survey, and Sources -- 2. The Rural Financial System and Rural Development in China -- Part II. The Design of China's Economic and Political Institutions -- 3. The Design of China's Rural Credit Institutions -- 4. The Implications of Cadre Evaluation and Fiscal System for Local-Government Behavior -- Appendix: Township Cadre Evaluation Criteria in Wenling County, Zhejiang Province -- Part III. Case Studies: Blind Men and the Elephant -- 5. Diverging Pathways to Prosperity: Privately Led vs. Local Government-Led Industrialization -- 6. The Local Government-Led Path to Rural Decay -- Appendix: Revenue and Expenditures of the Perished Townships -- Conclusion -- Appendix: List of Non-Survey Field Interviews, 2003-6 -- Notes -- Glossary of Chinese Terms -- Index