The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma : : Why Election Observation Became an International Norm / / Susan D. Hyde.
Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats-undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic-invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion,...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2011] ©2015 |
Year of Publication: | 2011 |
Language: | English |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (264 p.) :; 2 halftones, 1 map, 18 tables, 17 charts/graphs |
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100 | 1 | |a Hyde, Susan D., |e author. |4 aut |4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut | |
245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma : |b Why Election Observation Became an International Norm / |c Susan D. Hyde. |
264 | 1 | |a Ithaca, NY : |b Cornell University Press, |c [2011] | |
264 | 4 | |c ©2015 | |
300 | |a 1 online resource (264 p.) : |b 2 halftones, 1 map, 18 tables, 17 charts/graphs | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
347 | |a text file |b PDF |2 rda | ||
505 | 0 | 0 | |t Frontmatter -- |t Contents -- |t List of Figures and Tables -- |t Acknowledgments -- |t Introduction -- |t 1. Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally Observed Elections -- |t 2. Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite Observers -- |t 3. Democracy-Contingent Benefits -- |t 4. Does Election Monitoring Matter? -- |t 5. The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic Manipulation -- |t Conclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing International Expectations -- |t Appendixes -- |t Selected Bibliography -- |t Index |
506 | 0 | |a Open Access |u https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |f unrestricted online access |2 star | |
520 | |a Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats-undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic-invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? In The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, Susan D. Hyde explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. Hyde argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government's purported commitment to democratic elections.Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces. | ||
538 | |a Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. | ||
540 | |a This eBook is made available Open Access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: |u https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |u https://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/open-access-policy | ||
546 | |a In English. | ||
588 | 0 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2022) | |
650 | 0 | |a Democratization. | |
650 | 0 | |a Election monitoring. | |
650 | 0 | |a Elections |x Corrupt practices. | |
650 | 0 | |a International relations. | |
650 | 4 | |a International Studies. | |
650 | 4 | |a Political Science & Political History. | |
650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections. |2 bisacsh | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Title is part of eBook package: |d De Gruyter |t Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |z 9783110536157 |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Title is part of eBook package: |d De Gruyter |t Cornell University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |z 9783110606744 |
776 | 0 | |c print |z 9780801449666 | |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801460777?locatt=mode:legacy |z Open Access |7 0 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780801460777 |z Open Access |7 0 |
856 | 4 | 2 | |3 Cover |u https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780801460777/original |
912 | |a 978-3-11-053615-7 Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013 |c 2000 |d 2013 | ||
912 | |a 978-3-11-060674-4 Cornell University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |c 2014 |d 2015 | ||
912 | |a GBV-deGruyter-alles | ||
912 | |a ZDB-23-GOA |