The Military Lens : : Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations / / Christopher P. Twomey.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Twomey, Christopher P.,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2011]; ©2011
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (272 p.) :; 1 halftone, 3 tables, 5 maps, 1 line drawing
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; Part I. The Dangers of Doctrinal Difference --; 1. The Military Language of Diplomacy --; 2. Doctrinal Differences and Misperception --; Part II. Chinese and American Puzzles --; 3. Comparing Theories of Victory: Facing Off over Korea --; 4. The United States Crosses the 38th Parallel --; 5. China Crosses the Yalu --; 6. China Postpones the Invasion of Taiwan --; Part III. Extending The Story --; 7. The Emergence of Doctrinal Differences in the Middle East, 1956 to 1973 --; 8. Implications for Theory and Dangers in the Taiwan Strait Today --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780801460036; 9783110536157
• DOI: 10.7591/9780801460036
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Christopher P. Twomey.

In The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy-and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines-or "theories of victory"-differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power.When states engage in strategic coercion-either to deter or to compel action-such problems can lead to escalation and war. Twomey assesses a wide array of sources in both the United States and China on military doctrine, strategic culture, misperception, and deterrence theory to build case studies of attempts at strategic coercion during Sino-American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the early years of the Cold War, as well as an examination of similar issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After demonstrating how these factors have contributed to past conflicts, Twomey amply documents the persistence of hazardous miscommunication in contemporary Sino-American relations. His unique analytic perspective on military capability suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider the military doctrine of the nations they are trying to influence.