Democracy and International Trade : : Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990 / / Daniel Verdier.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
• VerfasserIn: Verdier, Daniel,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2021]; ©1995
• Year of Publication: 2021
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (408 p.) :; 11 line illustrations, 15 tables
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; List of Tables and Figures --; Preface --; Introduction --; PART ONE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE --; One Trade and the Voter: A Survey of the Existing Literature --; Two The Electoral Regulation of Access --; Three The Trade Policy Process: A Typology --; Four Origins of the Trade Policy Process --; Five The Making of Trade Policy --; PART TWO: THE MAKING OF TRADE POLICY IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1990 --; Six The Case Studies --; Seven Descent into Depression, 1860-86 --; Eight Crisis and Response, 1887-1913 --; Nine The First World War, 1914-18 --; Ten Tariff-Making and State-Building, 1919-39 --; Eleven Creation of the Cold War Trading Regime, 1940-62 --; Twelve The Rise and Fall of Industrial Policy, 1963-89 --; Thirteen Conclusion --; APPENDIXES --; Appendix One Mathematical Appendix to Chapter Two --; Appendix Two Tariff Levels --; Appendix Three Partisan Bias in Voting on Trade Bills --; Notes --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780691228181; 9783110442496
• DOI: 10.1515/9780691228181?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Daniel Verdier.

In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.