Self-Policing in Politics : : The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians / / Glenn R. Parker.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Parker, Glenn R.,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2022]; ©2004
• Year of Publication: 2022
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (194 p.) :; 4 line illus. 35 tables.

Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on ec...

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• CHAPTER 1 What Is Opportunism and How Do We Control It?
• CHAPTER 2 How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics
• CHAPTER 3 Problems in the Market for Legislators
• CHAPTER 4 Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data
• CHAPTER 5 Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing
• CHAPTER 6 Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One?
• CHAPTER 7 Weaknesses in Reputational Controls In
• Conclusion
• APPENDIX 1 Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content
• APPENDIX 2 Examples of Categories of Employment
• APPENDIX 3 Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents
• APPENDIX 4 Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965–1996
• APPENDIX 5 Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions
• APPENDIX 6 Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis
• Notes
• References
• Name Index
• Subject Index