Optimal Imperfection? : : Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations / / George Downs, David M. Rocke.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
• VerfasserIn: Downs, George,; Rocke, David M.,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2021]; ©1995
• Year of Publication: 2021
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (176 p.) :; 12 figs. 6 tables
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; List of Figures --; List of Tables --; Preface --; Chapter 1 The Impact of Uncertainty --; Chapter 2 Game Theory and Uncertainty --; Chapter 3 Gambling for Resurrection --; Chapter 4 Optimal Imperfection: GATT and the Uncertainty of Interest Group Demands --; Chapter 5 Willing but Maybe Not Able: The Impact of Uncertainty about State Capacity --; Chapter 6 Conclusion --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780691225203; 9783110442496
• DOI: 10.1515/9780691225203?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: George Downs, David M. Rocke.

"Domestic politics matters" has become a rallying cry for international relations scholars over the past decade, yet the question still remains: Just how does it matter? In this book, George Downs and David Rocke argue that an important part of the international impact of domestic politics springs from the institutional responses to its many uncertainties. This impact is due not so much to the errors in judgment these uncertainties can cause as to the strategic and institutional consequences of knowing that such errors are possible. The heart of the book is its formal analysis of how three kinds of domestic uncertainty have shaped international relations through their influence on three very different institutions. One chapter deals with the decision rules that citizens create to cope with uncertainty about the quality of their representation, and how these can lead to the paradoxical "gambling for resurrection" effect. Another chapter describes the extent to which the weak enforcement provisions of GATT can be understood as a mechanism to cope with uncertain but intermittent interest group demands for protection. The third chapter looks at the impact of uncertainty on the creation, survival, and membership of multilateral regulatory institutions, such as the Montreal Protocol and EU, when some states question the capacity of other states to meet their treaty obligations.