Individual Strategy and Social Structure : : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / / H. Peyton Young.
Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2020] ©1998 |
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Young, H. Peyton, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2020] ©1998 1 online resource (208 p.) : 43 line illus., 1 table text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Evolutionary economics. Game theory. Institutional economics. Social institutions. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History. bisacsh Blume, Larry. Gibbs distribution. Hofbauer, Josef. Hurkens, Sjaak. Kandori, Michihiro. Kreps, David. Levine, David. Malouf, Michael. Nash, John. Owen, Guillermo. Schumpeter, Joseph. alternating offers model. basin of attraction. chicken game. disequilibrium. ergodic process. fashion game. finite improvement path. interpersonal comparisons. local conformity. marriage game. mode of a distribution. noise models. payoffs. proposal game. risk factor. roles in a game. social capital. successor state. vector field. Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 9783110442496 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214252?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691214252 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691214252.jpg |
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English |
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eBook |
author |
Young, H. Peyton, Young, H. Peyton, |
spellingShingle |
Young, H. Peyton, Young, H. Peyton, Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX |
author_facet |
Young, H. Peyton, Young, H. Peyton, |
author_variant |
h p y hp hpy h p y hp hpy |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Young, H. Peyton, |
title |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / |
title_sub |
An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / |
title_full |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young. |
title_fullStr |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young. |
title_auth |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX |
title_new |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : |
title_sort |
individual strategy and social structure : an evolutionary theory of institutions / |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2020 |
physical |
1 online resource (208 p.) : 43 line illus., 1 table |
contents |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX |
isbn |
9780691214252 9783110442496 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214252?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691214252 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691214252.jpg |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
300 - Social sciences, sociology & anthropology |
dewey-ones |
306 - Culture & institutions |
dewey-full |
306 |
dewey-sort |
3306 |
dewey-raw |
306 |
dewey-search |
306 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9780691214252?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
1198929682 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT younghpeyton individualstrategyandsocialstructureanevolutionarytheoryofinstitutions |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)554780 (OCoLC)1198929682 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 |
_version_ |
1806143295947014144 |
fullrecord |
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