Game Theory for Political Scientists /

Game Theory for Political Scientists / / James D. Morrow.

Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
VerfasserIn:
Morrow, James D.,
Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2020]
©1995
Year of Publication:2020
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (400 p.) :; 127 figs. 4 tables
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245 1 0 |a Game Theory for Political Scientists /  |c James D. Morrow. 
264 1 |a Princeton, NJ :   |b Princeton University Press,   |c [2020] 
264 4 |c ©1995 
300 |a 1 online resource (400 p.) :  |b 127 figs. 4 tables 
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505 0 0 |t Frontmatter --   |t CONTENTS --   |t LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES --   |t PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --   |t Chapter One. Overview --   |t Chapter Two. Utility Theory --   |t Chapter Three. Specifying a Game --   |t Chapter Four. Classical Game Theory --   |t Chapter Five. Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection --   |t Chapter Six. Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria --   |t Chapter Seven. More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria --   |t Chapter Eight. Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs --   |t Chapter Nine. Repeated Games --   |t Chapter Ten. Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? --   |t Appendix One: Basic Mathematical Knowledge --   |t Appendix Two: Answers to Selected Problems --   |t NOTES --   |t GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN GAME THEORY --   |t BIBLIOGRAPHY --   |t INDEX 
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520 |a Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. 
546 |a In English. 
588 0 |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Political science  |x Methodology. 
650 7 |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory.  |2 bisacsh 
653 |a Axelrod, Robert. 
653 |a Banks, Jeffrey. 
653 |a Baron, David. 
653 |a Binmore, Ken. 
653 |a Calvert, Randall. 
653 |a Coke machine example. 
653 |a Cuban Missile Crisis. 
653 |a Downs, Anthony. 
653 |a Eatwell, John. 
653 |a Enelow, James. 
653 |a Ferejohn, John. 
653 |a Harsanyi, John. 
653 |a Jackman, Robert. 
653 |a Kreps, David. 
653 |a Ledyard, John. 
653 |a Luce, R. Duncan. 
653 |a Morrow, James. 
653 |a Nalebuff, Barry. 
653 |a Ordeshook, Peter. 
653 |a Palfrey, Thomas. 
653 |a Raiffa, Howard. 
653 |a babbling equilibrium. 
653 |a feasible payoffs. 
653 |a information set. 
653 |a international crises. 
653 |a node. 
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