Unelected Power : : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State /

Unelected Power : : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State / / Paul Tucker.

How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public l...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2018
VerfasserIn:
Tucker, Paul,
Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2019]
©2018
Year of Publication:2019
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (664 p.)
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024 7 |a 10.1515/9780691196985  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Tucker, Paul,   |e author.  |4 aut  |4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 
245 1 0 |a Unelected Power :  |b The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State /  |c Paul Tucker. 
264 1 |a Princeton, NJ :   |b Princeton University Press,   |c [2019] 
264 4 |c ©2018 
300 |a 1 online resource (664 p.) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
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505 0 0 |t Frontmatter --   |t Contents --   |t Preface to the Paperback --   |t Preface --   |t 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values --   |t PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION --   |t 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State --   |t 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State --   |t 4. The Structure of the Administrative State --   |t 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies --   |t 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies --   |t 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation --   |t PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES --   |t 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1) --   |t 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2) --   |t 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy --   |t 11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation --   |t 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism --   |t PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES --   |t 13. States’ Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment --   |t 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives --   |t 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability --   |t 16. The Limits of Design --   |t PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION --   |t 17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy --   |t 18. The Shift in Ideas --   |t 19. Tempting the Gods --   |t 20. A Money-Credit Constitution --   |t 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State --   |t 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State --   |t 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State --   |t 24. Overmighty Citizens After All? --   |t Conclusion. Unelected Democrats --   |t APPENDIX --   |t ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --   |t BIBLIOGRAPHY --   |t INDEX 
506 0 |a restricted access  |u http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec  |f online access with authorization  |2 star 
520 |a How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. 
546 |a In English. 
588 0 |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jun 2022) 
650 0 |a Banking law. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking  |x State supervision. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking-State supervision. 
650 0 |a Financial institutions  |x Government policy. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy. 
650 7 |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business.  |2 bisacsh 
653 |a Accountability. 
653 |a Adjudication. 
653 |a Administrative law. 
653 |a Balance sheet. 
653 |a Bank for International Settlements. 
653 |a Bank of England. 
653 |a Bank. 
653 |a Basic law. 
653 |a Central bank. 
653 |a Civil service. 
653 |a Committee. 
653 |a Consideration. 
653 |a Constitutionalism. 
653 |a Contract. 
653 |a Cost–benefit analysis. 
653 |a Crisis management. 
653 |a Criticism. 
653 |a De facto. 
653 |a Deliberation. 
653 |a Democracy. 
653 |a Democratic deficit. 
653 |a Discretion. 
653 |a Due process. 
653 |a Economic policy. 
653 |a Economics. 
653 |a Economist. 
653 |a Economy. 
653 |a Election. 
653 |a Executive (government). 
653 |a Executive agency. 
653 |a Financial crisis. 
653 |a Financial institution. 
653 |a Financial intermediary. 
653 |a Financial regulation. 
653 |a Fiscal policy. 
653 |a Governance. 
653 |a Government agency. 
653 |a Government bond. 
653 |a Government failure. 
653 |a Government. 
653 |a Inflation. 
653 |a Institution. 
653 |a Interest rate. 
653 |a Job security. 
653 |a Judicial independence. 
653 |a Judiciary. 
653 |a Jurisdiction. 
653 |a Lawmaking. 
653 |a Legislation. 
653 |a Legislator. 
653 |a Legislature. 
653 |a Legitimacy (political). 
653 |a Legitimation. 
653 |a Lender of last resort. 
653 |a Liberal democracy. 
653 |a Liberalism. 
653 |a Macroeconomics. 
653 |a Market economy. 
653 |a Market liquidity. 
653 |a Monetary Policy Committee. 
653 |a Monetary authority. 
653 |a Monetary policy. 
653 |a Nondelegation doctrine. 
653 |a Ordinary law. 
653 |a Policy. 
653 |a Political economy. 
653 |a Political party. 
653 |a Political philosophy. 
653 |a Political science. 
653 |a Politician. 
653 |a Politics. 
653 |a Primary and secondary legislation. 
653 |a Principal–agent problem. 
653 |a Principles (retailer). 
653 |a Provision (contracting). 
653 |a Public administration. 
653 |a Public consultation. 
653 |a Public policy. 
653 |a Regime. 
653 |a Regulation. 
653 |a Regulatory agency. 
653 |a Regulatory capture. 
653 |a Regulatory state. 
653 |a Representative democracy. 
653 |a Requirement. 
653 |a Rule of law. 
653 |a Separation of powers. 
653 |a Social cost. 
653 |a State of emergency. 
653 |a Statute. 
653 |a Supply (economics). 
653 |a Tax. 
653 |a Technocracy. 
653 |a The Administrative State. 
653 |a Trade-off. 
653 |a Treaty. 
653 |a Uncertainty. 
653 |a Veto. 
653 |a Voting. 
653 |a Welfare. 
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776 0 |c print  |z 9780691196305 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy 
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