Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability / / ed. by Jean-Marie Baland, Samuel Bowles, Pranab Bardhan.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• MitwirkendeR: Agarwal, Bina,; Baland, Jean-Marie,; Bardhan, Pranab,; Bowles, Samuel,; Boyce, James K.,; Cardenas, Juan-Camilo,; Das, Sanghamitra,; Dayton-Johnson, Jeff,; Gaspart, Frederic,; Ghatak, Maitreesh,; Janssen, Marco A.,; Karaivanov, Alexander,; Mehta, Bhupendra Singh,; Mookherjee, Dilip,; Ostrom, Elinor,; Platteau, Jean-Philippe,; Prabhakar, Rajagopal,; Sarkar, Rinki,; Singleton, Sara,; Somanatban, Eswaran,
• HerausgeberIn: Baland, Jean-Marie,; Bardhan, Pranab,; Bowles, Samuel,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2018]; ©2007
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource

Would improving the economic, social, and political condition of the world's disadvantaged people slow--or accelerate--environmental degradation? In Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability, leading social scientists provide answers to this difficult question, using new research on the impact of inequality on environmental sustainability. The contributors' findings suggest that inequality may exacerbate environmental problems by making it more difficult for individuals, groups, and nations to cooperate in the design and enforcement of measures to protect natural assets ranging from local commons to the global climate. But a more equal division of a given amount of income could speed the process of environmental degradation--for example, if the poor value the preservation of the environment less than the rich do, or if the consumption patterns of the poor entail proportionally greater environmental degradation than that of the rich. The contributors also find that the effect of inequality on cooperation and environmental sustainability depends critically on the economic and political institutions governing how people interact, and the technical nature of the environmental asset in question. The contributors focus on the local commons because many of the world's poorest depend on them for their livelihoods, and recent research has made great strides in showing how private incentives, group governance, and government policies might combine to protect these resources.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction -- CHAPTER 2. Collective Action on the Commons: The Role of Inequality -- CHAPTER 3. Inequality and Collective Action -- CHAPTER 4. Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources by a Heterogeneous Population -- CHAPTER 5. Inequality and the Governance of Water Resources in Mexico and South India -- CHAPTER 6. Managing Pacific Salmon: The Role of Distributional Conflicts in Coastal Salish Fisheries -- CHAPTER 7. Heterogeneity and Collective Action for Effort Regulation: Lessons from Senegalese Small-Scale Fisheries -- CHAPTER 8. Wealth Inequality and Overexploitation of the Commons: Field Experiments in Colombia -- CHAPTER 9. Collective Action for Forest Conservation: Does Heterogeneity Matter? -- CHAPTER 10. Inequality, Collective Action, and the Environment: Evidence from Firewood Collection in Nepal -- CHAPTER 11. Gender Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability -- CHAPTER 12. Inequality and Environmental Protection -- Index