Beyond Individual Choice : : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / / Michael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold.
Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbit...
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Bacharach, Michael, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / Michael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2018] ©2006 1 online resource text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Hi-Lo Paradox -- Chapter 2. Groups -- Chapter 3. The Evolution of Group Action -- Chapter 4. Team Thinking -- Conclusion -- References -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal. Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Economics, Mathematical. Game theory. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory. bisacsh Gold, Natalie, editor. edt http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt Sugden, Robert, editor. edt http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442502 print 9780691120058 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691186313?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691186313 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691186313.jpg |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Bacharach, Michael, Bacharach, Michael, |
spellingShingle |
Bacharach, Michael, Bacharach, Michael, Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Hi-Lo Paradox -- Chapter 2. Groups -- Chapter 3. The Evolution of Group Action -- Chapter 4. Team Thinking -- Conclusion -- References -- Index |
author_facet |
Bacharach, Michael, Bacharach, Michael, Gold, Natalie, Gold, Natalie, Sugden, Robert, Sugden, Robert, |
author_variant |
m b mb m b mb |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author2 |
Gold, Natalie, Gold, Natalie, Sugden, Robert, Sugden, Robert, |
author2_variant |
n g ng n g ng r s rs r s rs |
author2_role |
HerausgeberIn HerausgeberIn HerausgeberIn HerausgeberIn |
author_sort |
Bacharach, Michael, |
title |
Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / |
title_sub |
Teams and Frames in Game Theory / |
title_full |
Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / Michael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold. |
title_fullStr |
Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / Michael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / Michael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold. |
title_auth |
Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Hi-Lo Paradox -- Chapter 2. Groups -- Chapter 3. The Evolution of Group Action -- Chapter 4. Team Thinking -- Conclusion -- References -- Index |
title_new |
Beyond Individual Choice : |
title_sort |
beyond individual choice : teams and frames in game theory / |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2018 |
physical |
1 online resource Issued also in print. |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Hi-Lo Paradox -- Chapter 2. Groups -- Chapter 3. The Evolution of Group Action -- Chapter 4. Team Thinking -- Conclusion -- References -- Index |
isbn |
9780691186313 9783110442502 9780691120058 |
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H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
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HB144 |
callnumber-sort |
HB 3144 B328 42006EB |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691186313?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691186313 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691186313.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
dewey-ones |
330 - Economics |
dewey-full |
330/.01/5193 |
dewey-sort |
3330 11 45193 |
dewey-raw |
330/.01/5193 |
dewey-search |
330/.01/5193 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9780691186313?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
1076450242 |
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Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
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Beyond Individual Choice : Teams and Frames in Game Theory / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
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