Auctions : : Theory and Practice / / Paul Klemperer.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Klemperer, Paul,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2018]; ©2004
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Series: The Toulouse Lectures in Economics
• Physical Description: 1 online resource
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; Introduction --; Part A: Introduction to the Theory --; Chapter One. A Survey of Auction Theory --; Part B: Applications to Other Areas of Economics --; Chapter Two. Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory --; Part C: Practical Auction Design --; Chapter Three. What Really Matters in Auction Design --; Chapter Four. Using and Abusing Auction Theory --; Part D: Case Study: The ''3G'' Mobile-Phone Auctions --; Chapter Five. Overview of the European Auctions --; Chapter Six. Designing the UK Auction --; Chapter Seven. Bidder Strategies --; Chapter Eight. Were Auctions a Good Idea? --; Suggestions for Course Outlines --; Solutions to Exercises --; References --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780691186290; 9783110442502
• DOI: 10.1515/9780691186290?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Paul Klemperer.

Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.