Why Not Default? : : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt / / Jerome E. Roos.

How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries-and the dangers this poses to democracyThe European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not...

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Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2019]
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Year of Publication:2019
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spelling Roos, Jerome E., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt / Jerome E. Roos.
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2019]
©2019
1 online resource (416 p.)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
text file PDF rda
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOXES -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION. The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -- PART I. The Theory of Sovereign Debt -- PART II. A Brief History of Sovereign Default -- PART III. The Lost Decade: Mexico (1982-1989) -- PART IV. The Great Default: Argentina (1999-2005) -- PART V. The Specter of Solon: Greece (2010-2015) -- CONCLUSION. Shaking Off the Burden -- APPENDIX. A Word on Methodology -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- INDEX
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star
How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries-and the dangers this poses to democracyThe European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates-why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts?In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone-including the dramatic capitulation of Greece's short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015.Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis-with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.
Issued also in print.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
Debts, Public Case studies.
Debts, Public History.
Debts, Public.
International finance.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General. bisacsh
Amsterdam capital market.
Argentina.
Bank of Greece.
Brady debt restructuring.
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
European debt crisis.
Great Depression.
Greece.
Greek debt crisis.
IMF.
International Monetary Fund.
King Philip II.
Latin America.
Mexico.
Syriza party.
bailout.
bankers' alliance.
bonds.
capitalism.
capitalist economy.
conditional lending.
contract enforcement.
credit class.
credit repayment.
credit-money.
credit.
creditors.
cross-border contract.
debt crisis.
debt moratorium.
debt repayment.
debt restructuring.
debt service.
debt servicing.
debtor compliance.
debtor discipline.
default.
democracy.
democratic institutions.
emergency lending.
enforcement mechanism.
external debt.
finance.
financial crisis.
fiscal distress.
foreign credit.
foreign debt servicing.
foreign investment.
global finance.
globalization.
intermediary.
international creditors.
international crisis management.
international debts.
international lending.
internationalization.
lending cycles.
long-term reputation.
market discipline.
power.
public debt.
repayment.
short-term credit.
social costs.
solvency.
sovereign debt crises.
sovereign debt repayment.
sovereign debt.
sovereign default.
spillover costs.
structural power.
syndicated lending.
trade sanctions.
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2019 English 9783110610765
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2019 9783110664232 ZDB-23-DGG
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Economics 2019 9783110606065 ZDB-23-DBV
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Economics, Law & Social Sciences 2019 ENG 9783110610130
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2019 9783110663365
print 9780691180106
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691184937?locatt=mode:legacy
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691184937
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language English
format eBook
author Roos, Jerome E.,
Roos, Jerome E.,
spellingShingle Roos, Jerome E.,
Roos, Jerome E.,
Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt /
Frontmatter --
CONTENTS --
TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOXES --
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --
INTRODUCTION. The Sovereign Debt Puzzle --
PART I. The Theory of Sovereign Debt --
PART II. A Brief History of Sovereign Default --
PART III. The Lost Decade: Mexico (1982-1989) --
PART IV. The Great Default: Argentina (1999-2005) --
PART V. The Specter of Solon: Greece (2010-2015) --
CONCLUSION. Shaking Off the Burden --
APPENDIX. A Word on Methodology --
NOTES --
REFERENCES --
INDEX
author_facet Roos, Jerome E.,
Roos, Jerome E.,
author_variant j e r je jer
j e r je jer
author_role VerfasserIn
VerfasserIn
author_sort Roos, Jerome E.,
title Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt /
title_sub The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt /
title_full Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt / Jerome E. Roos.
title_fullStr Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt / Jerome E. Roos.
title_full_unstemmed Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt / Jerome E. Roos.
title_auth Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt /
title_alt Frontmatter --
CONTENTS --
TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOXES --
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --
INTRODUCTION. The Sovereign Debt Puzzle --
PART I. The Theory of Sovereign Debt --
PART II. A Brief History of Sovereign Default --
PART III. The Lost Decade: Mexico (1982-1989) --
PART IV. The Great Default: Argentina (1999-2005) --
PART V. The Specter of Solon: Greece (2010-2015) --
CONCLUSION. Shaking Off the Burden --
APPENDIX. A Word on Methodology --
NOTES --
REFERENCES --
INDEX
title_new Why Not Default? :
title_sort why not default? : the political economy of sovereign debt /
publisher Princeton University Press,
publishDate 2019
physical 1 online resource (416 p.)
Issued also in print.
contents Frontmatter --
CONTENTS --
TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOXES --
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --
INTRODUCTION. The Sovereign Debt Puzzle --
PART I. The Theory of Sovereign Debt --
PART II. A Brief History of Sovereign Default --
PART III. The Lost Decade: Mexico (1982-1989) --
PART IV. The Great Default: Argentina (1999-2005) --
PART V. The Specter of Solon: Greece (2010-2015) --
CONCLUSION. Shaking Off the Burden --
APPENDIX. A Word on Methodology --
NOTES --
REFERENCES --
INDEX
isbn 9780691184937
9783110610765
9783110664232
9783110606065
9783110610130
9783110663365
9780691180106
callnumber-first H - Social Science
callnumber-subject HJ - Public Finance
callnumber-label HJ8015
callnumber-sort HJ 48015
genre_facet Case studies.
url https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691184937?locatt=mode:legacy
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691184937
https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691184937.jpg
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 300 - Social sciences
dewey-tens 330 - Economics
dewey-ones 336 - Public finance
dewey-full 336.34
dewey-sort 3336.34
dewey-raw 336.34
dewey-search 336.34
doi_str_mv 10.1515/9780691184937?locatt=mode:legacy
oclc_num 1079759422
work_keys_str_mv AT roosjeromee whynotdefaultthepoliticaleconomyofsovereigndebt
status_str n
ids_txt_mv (DE-B1597)501797
(OCoLC)1079759422
carrierType_str_mv cr
hierarchy_parent_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2019 English
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2019
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Economics 2019
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Economics, Law & Social Sciences 2019 ENG
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2019
is_hierarchy_title Why Not Default? : The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt /
container_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2019 English
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