Too Big to Jail : : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / / Brandon L. Garrett.
American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2014] ©2014 |
Year of Publication: | 2014 |
Edition: | Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only |
Language: | English |
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (340 p.) :; 1 line illustration, 17 graphs, 3 tables |
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Garrett, Brandon L., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / Brandon L. Garrett. Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2014] ©2014 1 online resource (340 p.) : 1 line illustration, 17 graphs, 3 tables text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. United States vs. Goliath -- 2. The Company in the Courtroom -- 3. What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? -- 4. The Ostriches -- 5. The Victims -- 6. The Carrot and the Stick -- 7. Enter the Monitors -- 8. The Constitutional Rights of Corporations -- 9. Foreign Corporate Criminals -- 10. The Future of Corporate Prosecutions -- Appendix -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought against a major company in the United States. Federal prosecutors benefit from expansive statutes that allow an entire firm to be held liable for a crime by a single employee. But when prosecutors target the Goliaths of the corporate world, they find themselves at a huge disadvantage. The government that bailed out corporations considered too economically important to fail also negotiates settlements permitting giant firms to avoid the consequences of criminal convictions. Presenting detailed data from more than a decade of federal cases, Brandon Garrett reveals a pattern of negotiation and settlement in which prosecutors demand admissions of wrongdoing, impose penalties, and require structural reforms. However, those reforms are usually vaguely defined. Many companies pay no criminal fine, and even the biggest blockbuster payments are often greatly reduced. While companies must cooperate in the investigations, high-level employees tend to get off scot-free. The practical reality is that when prosecutors face Hydra-headed corporate defendants prepared to spend hundreds of millions on lawyers, such agreements may be the only way to get any result at all. Too Big to Jail describes concrete ways to improve corporate law enforcement by insisting on more stringent prosecution agreements, ongoing judicial review, and greater transparency. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022) Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United States. Corporate governance Law and legislation United States. Corporation law -- United States -- Criminal provisions. Corporation law United States Criminal provisions. Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- United States. Corporations Corrupt practices United States. Criminal liability of juristic persons -- United States. Criminal liability of juristic persons United States. Tort liability of corporations -- United States. Tort liability of corporations United States. LAW / Criminal Law / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 9783110665901 https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674735712?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674735712 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674735712/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Garrett, Brandon L., Garrett, Brandon L., |
spellingShingle |
Garrett, Brandon L., Garrett, Brandon L., Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. United States vs. Goliath -- 2. The Company in the Courtroom -- 3. What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? -- 4. The Ostriches -- 5. The Victims -- 6. The Carrot and the Stick -- 7. Enter the Monitors -- 8. The Constitutional Rights of Corporations -- 9. Foreign Corporate Criminals -- 10. The Future of Corporate Prosecutions -- Appendix -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
author_facet |
Garrett, Brandon L., Garrett, Brandon L., |
author_variant |
b l g bl blg b l g bl blg |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Garrett, Brandon L., |
title |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / |
title_sub |
How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / |
title_full |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / Brandon L. Garrett. |
title_fullStr |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / Brandon L. Garrett. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / Brandon L. Garrett. |
title_auth |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. United States vs. Goliath -- 2. The Company in the Courtroom -- 3. What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? -- 4. The Ostriches -- 5. The Victims -- 6. The Carrot and the Stick -- 7. Enter the Monitors -- 8. The Constitutional Rights of Corporations -- 9. Foreign Corporate Criminals -- 10. The Future of Corporate Prosecutions -- Appendix -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
title_new |
Too Big to Jail : |
title_sort |
too big to jail : how prosecutors compromise with corporations / |
publisher |
Harvard University Press, |
publishDate |
2014 |
physical |
1 online resource (340 p.) : 1 line illustration, 17 graphs, 3 tables |
edition |
Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. United States vs. Goliath -- 2. The Company in the Courtroom -- 3. What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? -- 4. The Ostriches -- 5. The Victims -- 6. The Carrot and the Stick -- 7. Enter the Monitors -- 8. The Constitutional Rights of Corporations -- 9. Foreign Corporate Criminals -- 10. The Future of Corporate Prosecutions -- Appendix -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
isbn |
9780674735712 9783110665901 |
callnumber-first |
K - Law |
callnumber-subject |
KF - United States |
callnumber-label |
KF1301 |
callnumber-sort |
KF 41301 A2 |
geographic_facet |
United States. United States |
url |
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674735712?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674735712 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674735712/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
340 - Law |
dewey-ones |
345 - Criminal law |
dewey-full |
345.7 |
dewey-sort |
3345.7 |
dewey-raw |
345.7 |
dewey-search |
345.7 |
doi_str_mv |
10.4159/9780674735712?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
894668549 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT garrettbrandonl toobigtojailhowprosecutorscompromisewithcorporations |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)460884 (OCoLC)894668549 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Too Big to Jail : How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |
_version_ |
1806143253995585536 |
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