The Personal Vote : : Constituency Service and Electoral Independence / / Bruce Cain, Morris Fiorina, John Ferejohn.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter HUP e-dition: Complete eBook Package
• VerfasserIn: Cain, Bruce,; Ferejohn, John,; Fiorina, Morris,
• Place / Publishing House: Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2013]; ©1987
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Edition: Reprint 2014
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (268 p.) :; illustrations
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Preface --; Contents --; Introduction --; Part I. CONSTITUENCY SERVICE --; 1. Member Visibility and Member Images --; 2. The Nature of Constituency Service --; 3. Incentives for Serving the Constituency --; 4. Temporal Change in Constituency Service --; Part II. CONSTITUENT RESPONSE --; 5. Unraveling a Paradox --; 6. Member Behavior and Constituent Response --; 7.1 The Personal Vote --; Part III. THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS --; 8. Particular Interests and General Benefits --; 9. Implications for Political Institutions --; APPENDIX A. Coding Categories Equated in Comparisons of Open-ended Responses, 1958 and 1978 --; APPENDIX Β. Problems of Comparability in Open-ended Questions about the Congressional Candidates, 1958 and 1978 --; NOTES --; INDEX
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780674493285; 9783110353488; 9783110353495; 9783110442212
• DOI: 10.4159/harvard.9780674493285
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Bruce Cain, Morris Fiorina, John Ferejohn.

Modern legislators are increasingly motivated to serve their constituents in personal ways. Representatives act like ultimate ombudsmen: they keep in close touch with their constituents and try to cultivate a relationship with them based on service and accessibility. The Personal Vote describes the behavior of representatives in the United States and Great Britain and the response of their constituents as well. It shows how congressmen and members of Parliament earn personalized support and how this attenuates their ties to national leaders and parties. The larger significance of this empirical work arises from its implications for the structure of legislative institutions and the nature of legislative action. Personalized electoral support correlates with decentralized governing institutions and special-interest policy making. Such systems tend to inconsistency and stalemate. The United States illustrates a mature case of this development, and Britain is showing the first movements in this direction with the decline of an established two-party system, the rise of a centrist third party, greater volatility in the vote, growing backbench independence and increasing backbench pressure for committees and staff. This book is essential for specialists in American national government, British politics, and comparative legislatures and comparative parties.