A Theory of the Firm : : Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms / / Michael C. Jensen.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter HUP eBook Package Archive 1893-1999
• VerfasserIn: Jensen, Michael C.,
• Place / Publishing House: Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2003]; ©2003
• Year of Publication: 2003
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (323 p.)

This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incent...

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
• 1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s
• 2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
• 3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
• II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives
• 4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
• 5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
• 6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
• 7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
• 8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors
• Notes
• References
• Acknowledgments
• Index