The Federalist / / John Jay, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter HUP eBook Package Archive 1893-1999
• VerfasserIn: Hamilton, Alexander,; Jay, John,; Madison, James,
• MitwirkendeR: Sunstein, Cass R.,
• Place / Publishing House: Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2009]; ©2009
• Year of Publication: 2009
• Language: English
• Series: The John Harvard Library
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (656 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Introduction: The Enlarged Republic --; Note on the Text --; A Chronology of Events --; 1 Introduction --; 2 The Natural Advantages of Union --; 3 Union as a Requisite for National Safety --; 4 Relations with Foreign Powers --; 5 Separate Confederacies and Foreign Powers --; 6 Disunion and Dissension Among the States --; 7 Causes of Wars Among the States If Disunited --; 8 Consequences of Wars between States --; 9 Union as a Barrier to Faction and Insurrection --; 10 The Size and Variety of the Union as a Check on Faction --; 11 The Value of Union to Commerce and the Advantages of a Navy --; 12 Union and the National Revenue --; 13 Union and Economy in Government --; 14 Representative Republics and Direct Democracies --; 15 Defects of the Confederation --; 16 Inability of the Confederation to Enforce Its Laws --; 17 The Future Balance of State and National Powers --; 18 The Greek Confederacies --; 19 Medieval and Modern Confederacies --; 20 The Netherlands Confederacy --; 21 Defects of the Present Confederation --; 22 The Confederation: Lack of Powers and of Proper Ratification --; 23 The Necessity of an Energetic and Active National Government --; 24 To Provide for the Common Defense --; 25 The States and the Common Defense --; 26 The Powers of Congress and the Common Defense --; 27 The Enforcement of the Supreme Law of the Land --; 28 A National Army and Internal Security --; 29 The Regulation of the Militia --; 30 A General Power of Taxation --; 31 The Necessity of a National Power of Taxation --; 32 Exclusive and Concurrent Powers of Taxation --; 33 The Constitutionality of National Tax Laws --; 34 Concurrent Authority in Taxation --; 35 Further Reasons for an Indefinite Power of Taxation --; 36 Internal Taxes: Direct and Indirect --; 37 Problems Confronting the Federal Convention --; 38 Inconsistencies of Opponents of Ratification --; 39 Republicanism, Nationalism, Federalism --; 40 The Authority of the Convention --; 41 Powers Delegated to the General Government: I --; 42 Powers Delegated to the General Government: II --; 43 Powers Delegated to the General Government: III --; 44 Restrictions on Powers of the States --; 45 Powers and Continuing Advantages of the States --; 46 State and Federal Powers Compared --; 47 The Separation of Powers: I --; 48 The Separation of Powers: II --; 49 Appeal to the People in Cases of Disagreement --; 50 Periodical Appeals to the People --; 51 Checks and Balances --; 52 The House of Representatives --; 53 Annual and Biennial Elections --; 54 The Apportionment of Representatives and of Taxes --; 55 The House and Knowledge of Local Circumstances --; 56 Adequacy of Representation in the House --; 57 The Popular Basis of the House --; 58 The Future Size of the House --; 59 National Regulation of Congressional Elections --; 60 Safety in National Control of Elections --; 61 Uniformity in the National Control of Elections to the House --; 62 The Nature and the Stabilizing Influence of the Senate --; 63 The Necessity of a Senate --; 64 The Senate and the Treaty Power --; 65 The Senate: Appointments and Impeachments --; 66 The Senate: Further Consideration of the Impeachment Power --; 67 The Executive --; 68 The Method of Electing the President --; 69 Comparison of the President with Other Executives --; 70 Advantages of a Single Executive --; 71 The Presidential Term of Office --; 72 Re-Eligibility of the President --; 73 The Presidential Salary and Veto --; 74 The Military and Pardoning Powers of the President --; 75 The President and the Treaty Power --; 76 The President and the Appointing Power --; 77 The Powers of the President Concluded --; 78 The Judges as Guardians of the Constitution --; 79 The Position of the Judiciary --; 80 Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts --; 81 Distribution of the Judicial Power --; 82 The State and the Federal Courts --; 83 Trial by Jury --; 84 The Lack of a Bill of Rights --; 85 Conclusion --; Selected Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780674273344; 9783110442212; 9783110442205
• DOI: 10.4159/9780674273344?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: John Jay, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton.

Published serially in several New York papers between October 1787 and August 1788, the eighty-five Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pseudonym “Publius” advocated ratification of the proposed U.S. Constitution. Together these articles constitute one of the greatest American contributions to political thought. In his introductory essay, Cass R. Sunstein argues that in rejecting the claims of classical republicanism Publius embraces deliberative democracy, and reminds us that Publius’s arguments bear on current debates and “offer lessons for making war and making peace, and for domestic emergencies of many different kinds.” The John Harvard Library text reproduces that of the first book edition (1788), modernizing spelling and capitalization.