Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge /

Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge / / Julia Tanney.

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Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today's canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accept...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter E-BOOK GESAMTPAKET / COMPLETE PACKAGE 2013
VerfasserIn:
Tanney, Julia,
Place / Publishing House:Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2013]
©2012
Year of Publication:2013
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (328 p.)
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • 1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality (1995)
  • 2. Normativity and Thought (1999)
  • 3. Playing the Rule-Following Game (2000)
  • 4. Real Rules (2008)
  • 5. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes (1995)
  • 6. Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind (2005)
  • 7. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations (2009)
  • 8. Pain, Polio, and Pride: Some Reflections on "Becausal" Explanations
  • 9. How To Resist Mental Representations (1998)
  • 10. On The Conceptual, Psychological, And Moral Status Of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, And Other "Behaviorally Indistinguishable" Creatures (2004)
  • 11. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind
  • 12. Ryle's Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2011)
  • 13. Some Constructivist Thoughts about Self-Knowledge (1996)
  • 14. Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction (2002)
  • 15. Speaking One's Mind (2007)
  • 16. Conceptual Amorphousness, Reasons, and Causes
  • Acknowledgments
  • Provenance of Essays
  • Index

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