Law and Social Norms / / Eric Posner.
What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But h...
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Place / Publishing House: | Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2009] ©2002 |
Year of Publication: | 2009 |
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Posner, Eric, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Law and Social Norms / Eric Posner. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2009] ©2002 1 online resource (272 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Law and Collective Action -- Part one Models of Nonlegal Collective Action -- 2 A Model of Cooperation and the Production of Social Norms -- 3 Extensions, Objections, and Alternative Theories -- Part two Legal Applications -- 4 Gifts and Gratuitous Promises -- 5 Family Law and Social Norms -- 6 Status, Stigma, and the Criminal Law -- 7 Voting, Political Participation, and Symbolic Behavior -- 8 Racial Discrimination and Nationalism -- 9 Contract Law and Commercial Behavior -- Part three Normative Implications -- 10 Efficiency and Distributive Justice -- 11 Incommensurability, Commodification, and Money -- 12 Autonomy, Privacy, and Community -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behavior. The resulting behavioral patterns are called social norms. Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involve the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and nonprofit organizations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting, and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: Would the legalization of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? Is it beneficial to shame criminals? Why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? Would people vote more if non-voters were penalized? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022) Collective behavior. Game theory. Law and economics. Social norms. Sociological jurisprudence. LAW / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442205 https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042308?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674042308 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674042308/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Posner, Eric, Posner, Eric, |
spellingShingle |
Posner, Eric, Posner, Eric, Law and Social Norms / Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Law and Collective Action -- Part one Models of Nonlegal Collective Action -- 2 A Model of Cooperation and the Production of Social Norms -- 3 Extensions, Objections, and Alternative Theories -- Part two Legal Applications -- 4 Gifts and Gratuitous Promises -- 5 Family Law and Social Norms -- 6 Status, Stigma, and the Criminal Law -- 7 Voting, Political Participation, and Symbolic Behavior -- 8 Racial Discrimination and Nationalism -- 9 Contract Law and Commercial Behavior -- Part three Normative Implications -- 10 Efficiency and Distributive Justice -- 11 Incommensurability, Commodification, and Money -- 12 Autonomy, Privacy, and Community -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
author_facet |
Posner, Eric, Posner, Eric, |
author_variant |
e p ep e p ep |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Posner, Eric, |
title |
Law and Social Norms / |
title_full |
Law and Social Norms / Eric Posner. |
title_fullStr |
Law and Social Norms / Eric Posner. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Law and Social Norms / Eric Posner. |
title_auth |
Law and Social Norms / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Law and Collective Action -- Part one Models of Nonlegal Collective Action -- 2 A Model of Cooperation and the Production of Social Norms -- 3 Extensions, Objections, and Alternative Theories -- Part two Legal Applications -- 4 Gifts and Gratuitous Promises -- 5 Family Law and Social Norms -- 6 Status, Stigma, and the Criminal Law -- 7 Voting, Political Participation, and Symbolic Behavior -- 8 Racial Discrimination and Nationalism -- 9 Contract Law and Commercial Behavior -- Part three Normative Implications -- 10 Efficiency and Distributive Justice -- 11 Incommensurability, Commodification, and Money -- 12 Autonomy, Privacy, and Community -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
title_new |
Law and Social Norms / |
title_sort |
law and social norms / |
publisher |
Harvard University Press, |
publishDate |
2009 |
physical |
1 online resource (272 p.) |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Law and Collective Action -- Part one Models of Nonlegal Collective Action -- 2 A Model of Cooperation and the Production of Social Norms -- 3 Extensions, Objections, and Alternative Theories -- Part two Legal Applications -- 4 Gifts and Gratuitous Promises -- 5 Family Law and Social Norms -- 6 Status, Stigma, and the Criminal Law -- 7 Voting, Political Participation, and Symbolic Behavior -- 8 Racial Discrimination and Nationalism -- 9 Contract Law and Commercial Behavior -- Part three Normative Implications -- 10 Efficiency and Distributive Justice -- 11 Incommensurability, Commodification, and Money -- 12 Autonomy, Privacy, and Community -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
isbn |
9780674042308 9783110442205 |
callnumber-first |
K - Law |
callnumber-subject |
K - General Law |
callnumber-label |
K370 |
callnumber-sort |
K 3370 P67 42000EB |
url |
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042308?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674042308 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674042308/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
340 - Law |
dewey-ones |
340 - Law |
dewey-full |
340/.115 |
dewey-sort |
3340 3115 |
dewey-raw |
340/.115 |
dewey-search |
340/.115 |
doi_str_mv |
10.4159/9780674042308?locatt=mode:legacy |
oclc_num |
1312725810 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT posnereric lawandsocialnorms |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)584825 (OCoLC)1312725810 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Law and Social Norms / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
_version_ |
1770176191047663616 |
fullrecord |
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